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when volatilities are different and the correlation between firm and project cash flows is high. I 
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An Empirical Analysis of the Determinants of Project Finance: 
Cash Flow Volatility and Correlation 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
Project finance is a financing mechanism where a firm (project sponsor) forms a separate 
legal project company whose assets and cash flows are separated from the firm and provides 
equity and raise non-recourse debt to carry out a specific business operation for a finite period of 
time.1 On the other hand, the firm (non-sponsor) can finance a project without legally separating 
it from its existing assets; I call this method of financing corporate finance. In recent years, 
global project finance investment has experienced a phenomenal growth from about $10 billion 
in the late 1980s to $328 billion in 2006. Project finance expenditure by US firms in 2006 was 
$47 billion surpassing venture capital funding of $41 billion or initial public offerings (IPOs) of 
$43 billion (Esty and Sesia, 2007). There are a number of papers, theoretical and empirical, 
dealing with various aspects of corporate finance, IPOs or venture capital. Project finance, on the 
other hand, has received considerably less attention; in particular there are only a few empirical 
papers that examine issues related to project finance.2  
In this paper, I use a pure-play approach to measure unobservable project cash flows and 
identify the projects of non-sponsor firms. Then I examine how two determinants suggested by 
extant theory (Leland (2007)), namely, the correlation (0< ρ <1) between firm and project cash 
flows  and volatilities of the firm and project cash flows, affect a firm’s choice to resort to 
project finance. Leland’s theoretical model predicts that project finance is more likely when the 
magnitude of difference between firm and project cash flow volatilities is large. Further, for a
                                                 
1 Project finance is a type of structured finance, a non-conventional way of raising funds. Other types of structured 
finances include acquisition finance, leveraged buyout, leasing, and securitization. 
2 See, for example, Byoun, Kim, and Yoo (2010), Corielli, Gatti, and Steffanoni (2008), Esty, and Megginson 
(2003), Gatti, Kleimeier, Megginson, and Steffanoni (2008), Kleimeier, and Megginson (2001), Kleimeier, and 
Versteeg (2010), Sawant (2010), and Subramanian, Tung, and Wang (2009). 
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given level of volatility difference, the likelihood of project finance is increasing with the 
correlation between firm and project cash flows. I examine a sample of 577 projects financed by 
US and non-US sponsors and find evidence consistent with both these hypotheses.  I show that 
project finance is most likely when volatility difference is high and correlation between firm and 
project cash flows is high. I present evidence that these findings hold both at the firm and the 
industry levels and are also robust to different methods of identifying project cash flows, two 
volatility measures, alternate econometric model specifications and potential selection bias.   
In the literature, the firm’s decision to combine or separate its activities are explained 
primarily by positive or negative operational synergies created by economies of scale, market 
power, incomplete contracting and agency costs (Coase, 1937; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Wiliamson, 1994; Hart and Moore, 1990; Chandler, 1990).  Several theory papers also model 
firm’s choice of project finance as a function of the agency cost of debt (Berkovitch and Kim, 
1990; John and John, 1991; Flannery, et. al., 1993) but do not look at financial synergies that 
arise from increased debt capacity. The theoretical framework of Leland’s (2007) focuses on the 
effects on the financial synergies from combining assets under a single firm.  Total financial 
synergies in the Leland framework arises from changing a firm’s capital structure and are 
determined by two effects, namely, the leverage effect and the limited liability effect. The 
leverage effect consists of the change in the value of debt tax shield and the change in expected 
default costs.  The diversification benefits from combining assets with low cash flow correlation 
increases debt tax shields by increasing debt capacity and reduces expected default costs 
(Lewellen, 1971). Thus, the magnitude of the leverage effect is decreasing in correlation between 
firm and project cash flows. The limited liability effect, on the other hand, is due to the valuable 
option that shareholders have of walking away from a potentially unprofitable firm.  The value of 
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this option to walk away is increasing in cash flow volatility (Scott, 1977; Sarig, 1985). Since 
combining assets reduces volatility, the limited liability effect always favors separation of assets. 
Low correlation between the cash flows of the project and the firm can, therefore, imply a 
preference for combining assets (corporate finance) because of the leverage effect or for keeping 
them separate (project finance) because of the limited liability effect. For any less than perfect 
correlation between firm and project cash flows, financial synergies from combining assets 
increase because of leverage effect and decrease because of limited liability effect. In other 
words, Leland shows that combining assets does not necessary lead to higher financial synergies 
as opposed to Lewellen (1971) who asserts that combining assets with imperfect correlation 
always creates positive financial synergies. Using numerical simulation, Leland then shows that 
the financial synergy from combining assets is maximized when the volatilities of the firm and 
the project are low and of similar magnitude.  He also shows that when the volatilities of the firm 
and project cash flows are sufficiently different, combining assets with different cash flow 
volatilities decreases the expected default cost of high volatility asset, which may not be 
sufficient to compensate the increase in the expected default cost of low volatility asset.  Under 
this scenario, each asset can separately optimize its debt; the leverage effect and limited liability 
effects are both negative and result in negative financial synergy.  Therefore, for a given level of 
correlation, when the volatilities of the firm and project cash flows are different, project finance 
may be the favorable outcome.  
Three empirically testable hypotheses regarding the choice of project finance over 
corporate finance follow from the discussion above. First, if cash flow volatilities of the firm and 
the project are significantly different, limited liability effect may dominate leverage effect and 
create negative financial synergy. In this case, project finance is preferable to corporate finance.  
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Second, for a given difference in cash flow volatilities, increasing the correlation of the assets 
decreases leverage effect. At the same time, the higher is the volatility, the more valuable is the 
walk-away option and hence the greater is the value of the limited liability effect.  Thus, when 
cash flow volatilities of the firm and the project differ significantly, high correlation between the 
firm and the project cash flows increases the likelihood of project finance. Finally, if asset 
volatilities are low and similar, low correlation between the firm and the project cash flows 
increases leverage effect, minimizes the loss from limited liability effect and thus decreases the 
likelihood of project finance. 
However, the practical difficulties involved in conducting empirical tests in project 
finance arise from two sources. First is the inability to observe project cash flows. Since almost 
all the projects are formed as private companies or joint ventures or subsidiaries, the information 
on project cash flow is not publicly available. The second difficulty arises due to the 
unobservability of the projects of the non-sponsors. Non-sponsor firms do not structure their 
projects as separate legal entities.  However, in order to compare project finance with corporate 
finance, one must also observe projects selected by non-sponsor firms. In my empirical analysis, 
I circumvent these two problems in the following manner.  With respect to the difficulty in 
identifying project cash flows of the sponsor firms, I assume that project cash flow 
characteristics are similar to that of a single segment firm operating in the same three-digit SIC 
code.  Second, for each project by the sponsor, I identify a non-sponsor firm that has investments 
in the same industry as the project of the sponsor firm.  To be classified as a non-sponsor, I 
require that the firm not have engaged in project finance during the sample period from 1990-
2008. I assume that this is the firm that chooses to finance a similar investment using corporate 
finance rather than project finance. This non-sponsor firm can be a multi-segment firm with a 
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segment in the project’s industry or a single segment firm. When the non-sponsor is a multi-
segment firm, the cash flow of the segment is the cash flow of its investment/project. For a single 
segment non-sponsor firm, the firm is its segment and therefore, the cash flow of the firms equals 
the cash flow of the segment. This way, the cash flow of a single segment non-sponsor 
corresponds to that of the single segment sponsor who invests in a project in the same industry. 
Similarly, the cash flow of a multi-segment non-sponsor corresponds to that of the single /multi 
segment sponsor who invests in a project in a different industry. This construction allows me to 
compare the volatility difference between two different pairs of entities (a) sponsor – project and 
(b) non-sponsor – segment/project from the same industry.  The final sample consists of 631 
firm-year observations of 240 US and 200 Non-US sponsors totaling 577 projects. The non-
sponsor sample includes approximately 20,000 firm-year observations of 4,016 US and non-US 
firms.   
The findings from my empirical analyses offer strong support for the three hypotheses 
relating to the determinant of project finance described earlier.  First, I find that the higher is the 
volatility differences, the greater is the likelihood that the firm will choose project finance. The 
results are qualitatively similar for industry level analysis. Second, the likelihood of project 
finance is the highest when the correlation between sponsor and project cash flows is high and 
the risk of the project is different from the risk of the sponsor. Finally, when the cash flow 
volatility of the project is low and similar to that of the firm and there is a low correlation 
between the firm and project cash flows, corporate finance is the preferred choice. In addition to 
that, firm’s size, project size, and leverage play positive and significant roles in the choice of 
project finance. The findings are robust to various definitions of project cash flow and volatility 
measures, alternative econometric specifications and selection bias.  
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In general, this article is closely related to research on the relation between firm’s capital 
structure and the decision to joint/separate incorporation. For example, this study is similar in 
spirit to the existing literature that analyzes how separate incorporation (project finance) can 
mitigate agency problems of debts, namely underinvestment (Berkovitch and Kim, 1990; John 
and John, 1991; and Flannery, et. al., 1993). The findings in my paper are consistent with 
Flannery, et. al. (1993), John and John (1991) and John (1993) with the exception that in their 
models, differences in cash flow volatilities lead to investment distortion and potential asset 
substitution and increases the likelihood of separating the project from the firm. The results in 
this study also complements the body of research that explains the existence of project finance 
from different perspectives, such as managerial ability and control benefit (Chemmanur and 
John, 1996), information asymmetry (Shah and Thakor, 1986; Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 
1999), organizational substitute for incomplete contracting (Faure-Grimaud and Inderst, 2004; 
Inderst and Muller, 2003; Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson, 2004; and Subramanian, Tung and 
Wang, 2009). 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The following section provides background 
information on project finance. I develop the conceptual background for the empirical tests in 
section 3. Section 4 describes data collection, sample construction and variable design. Section 5 
presents main findings. Section 6 discusses the results of robustness tests. Section 7 concludes 
the paper. 
 
2. Project Finance: Organizational Aspects 
International Project Finance Association defines project finance as “the financing of 
long-term infrastructure, industrial projects and public services based upon a non-recourse or 
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limited recourse financial structure where project debt and equity used to finance the project are 
paid back from the cash flow generated by the project”.3  This definition highlights two key 
features of project finance – large investment and limited or nonrecourse debt but omits the 
important organizational aspect- legal independence of the project entity. Also, project financing 
is not limited to the type of economic/business units specified in the definition. Firms in a wide 
variety of industries, such as oil and gas exploration, plant construction, hotel and entertainment, 
mining, telecommunication, agriculture, medical facilities, and research and development, use 
project structure (Kensinger and Martin, 1988).  
Three important structural characteristics of project finance companies are (a) legal 
independence, (b) concentrated equity and debt ownership and (c) non-recourse leverage. Project 
is a separate legal entity with limited life and specific purpose, created by a firm known as 
project sponsor. The sponsor provides equity; however, the project, its assets and cash flows are 
separated from the sponsor. The project usually appears as an off-balance sheet item in the 
sponsor’s financial statements. In cases where a single sponsor assumes 100% ownership, the 
project does appear on the sponsor’s balance sheet. The common legal structures used by project 
companies are corporation, limited-liability company, subsidiaries, partnership, unincorporated 
joint venture and trust.  
 Projects are heavily debt financed; debt accounts for about 70 to 90 percent of total 
ownership in project company compared to 25 to 35 percent for a typical industrial firm. 
Syndicated bank debt is the predominant mode of financing.   Most projects also have a fewer 
number of shareholders, usually two or three (Esty and Sesia, 2007).  
                                                 
3 Limited recourse feature implies that sometimes the sponsor/parent company offers additional guarantees to the 
debtholders of the project. This guarantee may take the form of a partial payment of the principal, and/or the 
guarantee is valid for a defined time period. 
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 The limited/non-recourse nature of project debt implies that the project’s debt service 
depends only on the project’s cash flows and the lenders do not have a claim on the asset of the 
sponsor firm in case of a default.4 Therefore, unlike traditional corporate lending, where creditors 
check the creditworthiness of the total firm before they offer the loan, the lenders in project 
assess purely the cash flow generation capability and the assets of the project. The reputation of 
the sponsor firm does not influence the debt raising capability of the project, however, the 
reputation of the lead arranger in the project finance syndicated loans decreases the spread of the 
project loan (Gatti, Kleimeier, Megginson, and Steffanoni, 2008). 
Project finance is also known as contract finance as number of contracts for larger 
projects can range from several hundred to several thousand (Esty, 2003).  Setting up a project 
involves various transaction costs such as fees to financial and legal advisors, payment to 
consultants who assess the feasibility of the projects, cost of tax advice and loan documentation, 
etc. The time to set up a project company ranges from six month to eighteen months and 
contracting costs absorb 5 to 10 percent of total project costs (Esty, 2004). Cost of debt is also 
typically higher for a project finance loan compared to a corporate loan.  The premium for a 
project finance loan ranges from 50 to 100 basis points above and over a corporate loan with the 
anticipation that contractual commitments might fail to support debt servicing in some 
unforeseen events (Finnerty, 1996). 
Overall, project finance has the following advantages - (a) high debt levels discipline 
managers and mitigate the agency costs of free cash flow (b) claims are limited to project cash 
flows, which mitigates underinvestment problems due to both the agency cost of debt and 
information asymmetries, (c) joint ownership can resolve the hold- problem among the sponsors 
                                                 
4 Limited recourse debt maintains the primary criterion that debt servicing must come from the specific project for 
which it has been raised. 
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and (d) off-balance sheet financing allows the sponsor to transfer risk from existing shareholders 
to new investors.5  However, the dark side of the off-balance sheet financing is that firm may use 
project finance to avoid reporting assets and liabilities and to defer losses (Powers, 2002). The 
other disadvantage includes the costs associated with complex project finance structures.  The 
following section discusses how project characteristics such as separate incorporation and high 
leverage create sufficient financial synergy and provide the firm an incentive to choose project 
finance above and beyond the four advantages mentioned above.  
 
3.  Conceptual Background and Hypothesis Development 
Change in capital structure creates financial synergy.  Lewellen (1971) argues that since 
the cash flows from two assets are never perfectly positively correlated, combining assets always 
increases debt capacity and associated tax benefits. Therefore, financial synergies of a joint 
entity are always positive. On the other hand, total financial synergies in the Leland (2007) 
framework are determined by two effects, namely, the leverage effect and the limited liability 
effect. Through numerical solutions, Leland shows that when cash flow volatilities of two assets 
are different from each other, financial synergies from combining them under a single firm can 
be negative and sufficiently large to explain the existence of separate incorporation.6  The 
following paragraphs discuss how leverage and limited liability create financial synergies. 
 3.1 Leverage Effect  
 Leland (2007) describes leverage effect as the net outcome of the gain/loss from 
debt tax shield and the expected cost of default. Combining assets with imperfectly correlated 
                                                 
5 Esty (2003) provides a thorough analysis of the advantages of project finance. 
6 Negative operational synergy is often claimed to be the prime reason for separate incorporation. See Rajan, 
Servaes, and Zingales (2000) for a discussion on diversification discount. Spin-off and divestiture literature also 
suggests that breakups create values by reversing negative synergies (Eckbo and Thorburn, 2008). 
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cash flows reduces the overall risk due to diversification.  Therefore, the combined firm can raise 
more debt, sometimes at a cheaper rate, compared to separate stand-alone firms. More debt, 
hence more interest deduction usually provides a tax savings for the combined firm. This gain 
can, however, also be negative if the combined firm’s lower cost of debt reduces interest 
expense. On the other hand, the probability of default is always lower for a combined firm 
compared to stand-alone firms as diversification reduces operational risk for the former. In 
summary, there is a benefit from the reduction in expected default cost but there could be a tax 
gain or loss depending on total interest deductions. Therefore, the net leverage effect from 
combining multiple assets could be positive or negative. When there is a low correlation between 
the firm and project cash flows, combining the project with the firm’s existing assets reduces the 
probability of default and the cost of debt. It creates a positive leverage effect; however, the 
magnitude of the leverage effect is decreasing in correlation. In addition to that, if the assets have 
similar cash flow volatilities, the loss from limited liability effect is minimal (discussed in the 
next section). Therefore, combining assets with similar volatilities and low correlation can 
achieve positive financial synergies. 
 3.2 Separate Incorporation and Limited Liability Effect 
 Separate incorporation provides an option, coined as limited liability effect in 
Leland’s model, to the shareholders to walk away from future losses if the asset generates 
negative cash flows (Scott, 1977; Sarig, 1985).  Combining two separate assets implies giving up 
two options for a less valuable single option, thus limited liability effect always favors 
separation.  The higher is the cash flow volatility of the asset, the higher is the probability that 
the asset will generate negative cash flow and thus the more valuable is the walk-away option.   
Therefore, when the magnitude of the volatility difference between the assets is high, keeping 
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them separate increases the limited liability benefit.  Additionally, if there is a high correlation 
between the cash flows of the assets, diversification benefit is negligible.  Leland (2007) shows 
that under this scenario, financial synergy is maximized by keeping the assets separate.  
One of the implications of Flannery, et. al. (1993) is similar to the limited liability effect 
discussed above. In their model, a diversified holding company can optimally choose its debt 
level if the parent company allows the subsidiary to issue its own debt. If the cash flow volatility 
of the subsidiary is significantly different from the cash flow volatility of the parent and the 
correlation of cash flows between the subsidiary and the parent is high, then issuing debt at the 
subsidiary level will mitigate asset substitution problem. Thus, the predictions from both the 
models are similar. From an empirical standpoint, asset substitution effect is incremental to 
limited liability effect and is expected to strengthen the findings of this paper.  
 3.3 Empirically Testable Hypotheses  
 In brief, Leland’s (2007) theoretical model shows that the interplay of the leverage 
and limited liability effects creates positive (negative) financial synergies. For any less than 
perfect correlation between firm and project cash flows, financial synergies from combining 
assets increase because of leverage effect and decrease because of limited liability effect.   
Correlation and volatility difference between the cash flows of the project and the firm then 
create a preference for combining assets (corporate finance) because of the leverage effect or for 
keeping them separate (project finance) because of the limited liability effect. The discussion 
above leads to the following empirically testable hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1: For any level of correlation between firm and project cash flows, when the 
project’s cash flow volatility is different from that of the firm, project finance is more likely than 
corporate finance. 
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Hypothesis 2: When the cash flow volatilities of the firm and the project are low and similar, the 
likelihood of project finance increases in correlation between firm and project cash flows.  
Hypothesis 3:  The probability of project finance is the highest when the cash flow volatilities of 
the firm and the project are different and correlation between firm and project cash flows is high.  
 
4.  Data, Variable Definition and Univariate Results 
 4.1 Sample 
 I compile the list of sponsor firms that invest in project finance and the information 
on projects from Global Public Finance (GPF) database of the Thomson Financial Securities 
Data Corporation (SDC). The sample of sponsors includes both US and Non-US sponsors who 
have invested in at least one project finance transaction during the period from 1990 to 2008.  I 
exclude the sponsors that are not public companies or trade in foreign stock exchanges and the 
projects that are cancelled/conventionally financed or rumored/pipeline projects or defaulted at 
some point in their life cycle. Some projects in the sample have government guarantees on the 
output produced.7 After carefully examining project synopses, I also drop projects that are not 
financed by limited/non-recourse debt and announced but non operational projects. The resulting 
initial sample consists of 3,149 sponsors with 2,460 completed or ongoing projects from 76 
countries. In the sample, there are 633 US sponsors who invested in 626 projects within and 
outside the US. The total number of sponsors is greater than total number of projects because 
some projects have multiple sponsors (See Appendix A1).  
                                                 
7 I repeat the tests including the firms that are traded in foreign stock exchanges and the results (Table 11: Panel C) 
are qualitatively similar. I drop defaulted projects due to the unavailability of appropriate matches - defaulted single 
segment firms - to proxy the cash flows of the projects as explained in detail in the following paragraph. Inclusion of 
projects with government guarantee does not bias the result since non-sponsor firms can also have similar 
guarantees. 
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This paper involves several stages of data collection on two pairs of entities: sponsor - 
project and non-sponsor – segment/project.  In the following paragraphs, I describe the process 
of sample construction for the US firms. The main variable of interest in this study is the cash 
flow volatility difference between the sponsor and the project. Since almost all the projects are 
formed as private companies or joint ventures or subsidiaries, the information on project cash 
flow is not publicly available. To circumvent this problem, I identify single segment US firms 
from the Compustat database operating in the same three-digit SIC industry as the project.  The 
rationale is that single segment firms operating in the same industry in the same country as the 
project will have similar cash flow volatilities and thus their cash flows can proxy for project 
cash flows. To mitigate the effect of firm size on cash flows, I scale the cash flow of the proxy 
firm by its total asset. Additionally, those single segment firms (proxy project) must have 
financial information for at least past five years starting from the fiscal year when the project is 
announced.  I exclude 1,188 sponsor firms from the sample because there is no proxy match for 
their projects.   
Next, I identify non-sponsor firms that did not engage in project finance transactions 
during the period from 1990 to 2008.  In my sample, US non-sponsors are firms in the 
Compustat North America database that are not listed in SDC Global Project Finance database as 
project sponsors and are not treated as proxy projects.   Unlike the sponsors, non-sponsor firms 
do not structure their projects as separate legal entities. Hence, it is difficult to identify their 
projects. I treat the segments of a multi-segment non-sponsor firm as its projects and include the 
firm in the sample if it belongs to the same three-digit SIC industry as the sponsor and if at least 
one of its segments shares the same industry as the project.8 For a single segment non-sponsor 
                                                 
8 I do not match sponsor and non-sponsor firms by size, because I want to see the effect of sponsor’s size on project 
finance choice.  
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firm, the firm is its project/segment and therefore, the cash flow of the firms equals the cash flow 
of the segment. This way, the cash flow of a single segment non-sponsor corresponds to that of 
the single segment sponsor who invests in a project in the same industry. Similarly, the cash flow 
of a multi-segment non-sponsor corresponds to that of the single /multi segment sponsor who 
invests in a project in a different industry.9 For US non-sponsors, I obtain segment information 
from the Compustat Segment database and define same industry at the three-digit SIC level.  
I follow a similar procedure as described above to create the non-US sample. I collect the 
data on non-US sponsors and non-sponsors from Datastream Worldscope database. Non-
sponsors’ segment information is gathered  primarily from Mergent Online,  which provides 
four-digit SIC code for non-sponsor’s primary and secondary business segments.  I use company 
financial report and company web site to collect segment information for firms which are not 
available on Mergent. Next, I create a one to one match between the segment definition and the 
SIC code and assign a three-digit code to these segments of non-US non-sponsors.10  
This multi-stage data collection process results in a sample such that each sponsor - 
project pair has at least one non-sponsor – segment/project pair from the same industry and the 
country. Since I compare the cash flow volatility between the sponsor and the project with that of 
the non-sponsor and segment/project, volatilities need be measured in the same year. Matching 
by year is also important because firms’ cash flow volatilities might change over time.  
                                                 
9 As proposed by Scharfstein and Stein (2000), due to divisional rent seeking and inefficient investment by the 
manager, multi-segment non-sponsor firm may cross-subsidize poor performing projects by using the cash flows of 
the better performing ones. This may increase the overall cash flow volatility of the firm. On the other hand, Campa 
and Kedia (1999) find that conglomerates sell at a discount before they implement diversification strategy, implying 
that diversification does not destroy firm value and hence, may not increase the cash flow volatility of the firm. Thus 
comparing cash flow volatilities of sponsor and multi-segment non-sponsor firms does not create any systematic 
bias in my tests. I also include single-segment non-sponsor firms in the sample, whose cash flow volatilities are not 
susceptible to this sort of influence.   
10 I also match the project and the proxy and the non-sponsor with the sponsor at the two-digit SIC level and the 
results are quantitatively similar.   
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Therefore, I match each sponsor–project with non-sponsor – segment/project by project initiation 
year.  
After obtaining data on other firm characteristics, the sample consists of 631 firm-year 
observations of 240 US and 200 Non-US sponsors with 577 projects during the period from 1990 
to 2008. There are 285 multi-segment and 155 single segment sponsors in the sample (see 
Appendix A2 for details).  About 52 percent of the projects (305) are originated in the US and 
272 projects are originated outside the US. The non-sponsor sample includes approximately 
20,000 firm-year observations of 4,016 US and non-US firms. Total number of firm-year 
observations varies for different samples and volatility measures. The largest sample is obtained 
when cash flow volatility measure is used and consists of 19,797 firm-year observations for non-
sponsors.  
Table 1 provides a snapshot of top 25 US and non-US sponsors and the number of 
projects undertaken by them.  Approximately 32 percent of sponsors are from South America 
and 12 percent of them are from the US. Most of these top 25 sponsors are large diversified 
companies in their respective countries and operate in many market segments. These sponsors 
have invested in about 42 percent of 577 projects. All sponsors in my sample (not reported in the 
table) come from 36 different two-digit SIC industry categories, however, approximately 48 
percent of them are from power, transportation, oil and gas, and leisure and property industries.  
Table 2 shows the distribution of projects over time in two-digit SIC industries. There is a 
significant increase in project finance activities in recent years, especially from 2001 to 2005. 
The sample excludes many deals from the year 2007 and 2008 due to the unavailability of 
financial and accounting information from Compustat and DataStream databases. Most of the 
projects are from electric and electronics, energy, telecommunication and chemicals industries.  
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However, project finance activities have extended over a wide variety of industries in the recent 
years.  Table 1 and 2 taken together suggest that the number of projects in my sample is 
concentrated among a few sponsor firms; sponsors and projects are mostly concentrated in a few 
industries and there is a time trend in project finance investment. Industry clustering suggests 
that industry characteristics can influence the firm’s choice of financing structure.11 Firm level 
clustering raises the possibility of self selection of sponsors who invest in project finance, which 
I explore in Section 6. In brief, these statistics demand that firm, industry and year effects need to 
be addressed in subsequent multivariate tests.   
Table 3 provides further evidence that sponsors rely extensively on external borrowings 
for the projects. The debt to asset ratio for an average project is 79.76 percent, which is 
consistent with Esty and Sesia (2007).  There are 88 cases of 100 percent debt financed deals in 
the sample which are mostly in power, oil and gas, petrochemical and telecommunication 
sectors. The average number of sponsors in a typical project is 1.11 suggests highly concentrated 
equity ownership. There is a wide variation in project costs in the sample.  The average project 
cost is $998.49 million with a standard deviation of $2,204.89 million.12 Panel B presents the 
statistics on the types of financing used by a project. Syndicated bank loan is the most prevalent 
source of project financing; 81.46 percent of the projects have raised money through bank loans.  
The average amount for a syndicated loan is $644.45 million with a standard deviation of 
$1,653.91 million.13 The next predominant source of financing is sponsors’ equity; sponsors 
have provided an average amount of 259.84 million for 72.44 percent of the projects in the 
                                                 
11 Theoretical, descriptive and empirical literature suggest that project finance in used in industries with high free 
cash flow and in countries with lower investors’ protections (Subramanian, Tung, and Wang, 2009);  firms use 
project finance structure for highly risky, capital intensive, high cash flow generating investments with relatively 
low control benefit (Shah and Thakor, 1986; Chemmanur and John, 1996, Esty and Sesia, 2007).  
12 The project cost does not reflect sponsors’ total investment in the projects since there can be multiple sponsors for 
a project. 
13 The summary statistics on syndicated loans are based on 564 project deals, since for 13  projects, the project cost 
is less than the loan amount, 
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sample. Though very few projects have raised funds through subordinated bonds, the average 
amount ($508.48 million) exceeds that of equity financing.14 
 4.2   Variables Measuring Volatility Difference and Correlation 
 The main variable in this study is the volatility differences between the sponsor and 
the project or the non-sponsor and its segment. First, I construct two measures of volatility - cash 
flow volatility and sales volatility, where cash flow is defined as operating income before 
depreciation.15  I normalize both cash flow and sales by total asset and calculate volatility as the 
standard deviation of the cash flows / sales for the five years preceding the project initiation year. 
If a project is originated in a different country than the sponsor’s, it is difficult to find a segment 
of the non-sponsor located in the project country. In this case, I multiply cash flow/sales 
volatility of the non-sponsor’s segment by the ratio of stock return volatility in the project 
country and the sponsor country. For example, if a US sponsor invests in a project outside the 
US, I multiply the cash flow/sales volatility of the US segment by (σproject country/σsponsor country), 
where σ is the stock return volatility of the respective countries. The stock market return 
volatility of a country should roughly reflect the volatility of the returns of the firm in that 
country.16  Following Edmans, et. al., (2010), I use daily total return index data from Datastream.  
I use a price index when total return index is unavailable. Next I calculate yearly returns and 
convert these returns in US dollar at the average exchange rate of the year. I use return data of 
five years preceeding project initiation year to compute the stock return volatility of the market.   
                                                 
14 Public bonds are a growing source of financing for project deals; however, I have few public bonds in my sample 
as these are mostly issued by governments.  
15 Following Schaefer and Strebulaev (2004), Leland (2007) estimates asset volatility from equity volatility for firms 
with investment grade debt and uses it as an approximation for cash flow volatility. I measure cash flow volatility 
directly for sponsor and non-sponsor firms. Further, the correlation between cash flow and sales volatility (not 
reported in the paper) is 0.51 and significant, which suggests that sales volatility can be used as an alternative 
measure. 
16 If stock market data at the industry level were available, more precise measure could have been (σIndustry, project 
country/σIndustry, sponsor country), where σ represents the volatility of stock return in the respective industries of project and 
sponsor countries.  
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Next, I calculate volatility differences as follows. For a sponsor, volatility difference is 
the absolute value of the difference in the standard deviation between the sponsor and proxy 
project. For a non- sponsor, volatility difference is measured as the absolute value of the 
difference in the standard deviation of the non- sponsor and its segment(s). In addition, I use two 
rank measures of cash flow and sales volatility, where volatility difference is divided in quartiles 
with 1 and 4 representing the lowest and the highest volatility difference, respectively. Rank 
measure is more appropriate when volatility tends to have extreme values; such is the case for 
cash flow volatility in my sample.  
 I also define two binary variables - similar volatility and different volatility – that 
measure how similar or different the volatilities of the sponsor and its project or the non-sponsor 
and its segment/project are.  Similar volatility equals 1 if the rank of volatility difference is either 
2 or 3 and different volatility takes a value of 1 if the rank of volatility difference is either 1 or 4. 
Next, I calculate the correlation of cash flows between the sponsor and the project by 
using the cash flow for five years preceding the project initiation year.  Then I create a 
correlation dummy which takes a value of 1(0) if the correlation of the observation is higher 
(lower) than the median correlation value of the sample. I also use an alternative measure where 
correlation dummy equals 1 if the sponsor and the project are from the same industry defined at 
the three-digit SIC level. I follow the similar procedure to calculate the correlation of cash flows 
between the non-sponsor and its segment/project.  
Table 4 presents the distribution of volatility differences and correlation measures for the 
sponsor and the project and the non-sponsor and the segment pairs. Non-sponsors’ statistics are 
based on only multi-segment firms, since there is no volatility difference between single segment 
non-sponsor and its project.  Panel A shows that cash flow volatility of the project is higher than 
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that of the sponsor for most of the observations in the sample. Only about one-third of the 
sponsors have higher cash flow volatilities than their projects.  On the other hand, sales volatility 
of each sponsor is greater than the project’s. Findings are similar for non-sponsors and their 
segments. In Panel B, I use the binary measure of correlation which takes a value of 1/0 
(high/low) if the sponsor and the project are from the same (different) industry. Similar measure 
is used for the non-sponsor and its segment. Approximately three - fourth of the sponsors in the 
sample have a low correlation with the project. However, almost all the non-sponsors (92.29 
percent) have segments from a different industry. The observed frequency of low correlation 
between the non-sponsor and its segment is consistent with the notion that multi-segment firms 
derive diversification benefit from low correlation.  
The interaction of correlation and volatility difference between the sponsor and the 
project is another interest variable in this paper. Panel C provides observed frequency and the 
percentage of sponsors and non-sponsors in each interaction category. In low correlation × 
similar volatility category, more than sixty percent of non-sponsors invest in segments/projects 
with similar cash flow volatility. Compared to that, only 39.04 percent sponsors invest in 
projects with similar volatility.  This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that project finance 
is less likely when the cash flow volatility of a project is similar to that of the sponsor and there 
is a low correlation between sponsor and project cash flows.  In high correlation × different 
volatility category, most of the sponsors (57.89 percent) as well as non-sponsors (89.75 percent) 
in the sample invest in projects/segments which have different cash flow volatilities. The similar 
pattern of this interaction for sponsors and non-sponsors is not consistent with the hypothesis that 
firms choose project finance when correlation is higher and volatility difference is greater. I 
explore this issue further in the multivariate analysis section.  
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 4.3   Other Variables  
 To control for other possible determinants of project finance, I use several firm-level 
control variables. Firm size, project size, and leverage capture the extent to which the firm needs 
to raise external capital. I measure Firm Size of sponsors and non-sponsor by the natural log of 
the book value of the total assets. Project Size is the natural log of project’s initial cost for a 
sponsor and the natural log of the book value of the segment’s assets for a non-sponsor, 
respectively. Leverage equals the book value of long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities 
divided by the book value of debt and market value of common equity. Unlike the non-sponsor, 
the observed leverage level of the sponsor firm might be understated since the sponsor is able to 
keep the project off-balance sheet. I construct a weighted average leverage of the sponsor and the 
project weighted by their total assets to reflect the combined debt level of the sponsor and the 
project if the project were internally financed.17 
Project finance structure can mitigate potential agency problem between management and 
shareholders when project are large, tangible  and have high free cash flows; can solve hold-up 
problems among sponsors through joint ownership; and can reduce the opportunity cost of 
underinvestment by creating projects with low growth options (Esty, 2003).  Leland’s (2007) 
model also derives the result under no agency cost between shareholders and managers, 
information symmetry and no operational synergies through asset substitution. Following Lehn 
and Paulsen (1989), I calculate Free Cash Flow by subtracting interest expense, taxes, preferred 
and common dividends from operating income before depreciation scaled by total assets.  I 
measure hold-up problem by Research & Development (R&D) scaled by total assets.  I set R&D 
value to zero if the firm does not report R&D expenditures. I use Market to Book as a proxy for 
                                                 
17 Since a project is usually 80 to 90 percent debt financed, calculating leverage in this manner overestimates the 
leverage for the sponsor. In reality, a firm does not issue such a high level of debt. Nonetheless, it demonstrates that 
a firm can increase its debt capacity by investing in project finance.  
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growth options, which is calculated as the book value of debt plus market value of common 
equity divided by total assets.  To control the effect of diversification (Diversified) on project 
finance choice, I calculate sales-based Herfindahl Index calculated as the sum of the squared 
market share of each firm in its three -digit SIC code industry.  Alternatively, I construct a binary 
variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm operates in more than one business segments.  
Shah and Thakor (1986) suggests that a firm finances its risky ventures through project 
finance to minimize the signaling cost; the empirical literature on spinoffs (Krishnaswami and 
Subramaniam, 1999)  also finds that firms with higher information asymmetry spin off to 
disseminate information in the market. I construct two measures to proxy for information 
asymmetry. First, I calculate Intangibility as one minus property, plant, equipment (PPE) plus 
inventory scaled by total asset. Intangibility is positively correlated with information asymmetry. 
The second measure is capital intensity which is computed as capital expenditure scaled by total 
assets and decreases with information asymmetry.  
 
5.  Determinants of Project Finance 
 5.1 Univariate Analysis 
 I hypothesize that volatility difference between the firm and project cash flows affect 
the choice of project finance. In Table 5, I present univariate results on cash flow/sale volatility, 
correlation of cash flows and other firm characteristics for sponsors and non-sponsors. Non-
sponsors include both single and multi-segment firms. The sponsor consists of about 3 percent of 
the total sample.  Panel A reports the differences in cash flow/sales volatilities between sponsor 
and project and non-sponsor and segment pairs. The mean/median difference in cash flow 
volatility between a sponsor and the project (0.54/ 0.09) is significantly greater than that between 
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a non-sponsor and its segment (0.12 / 0.02).18  The pattern is similar for sales volatility 
difference measure. The mean /median correlation of cash flows between the sponsor and the 
project (0.34/0.25) is also significantly higher than that between the non-sponsor and its segment 
(0.22/0.18).  These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the volatility difference 
between the sponsor and the project is significantly higher compared to that between the non-
sponsor and its segment.   
 Panel B further divides sponsors and non-sponsors into US and non-US subsamples and 
examines if there is a difference between them in other firm characteristics. Firm characteristics 
variables are winsorized at 2 percent and 98 percent.  I conduct t-tests to determine whether the 
mean (median) values across different sub-samples are statistically similar. The findings for US 
samples are described here. The mean/median cash flow volatility of sponsors (0.07/0.03) is 
significantly lower than that of non-sponsors (0.14/0.06). Taken together with cash flow 
volatility difference statistics in Panel A suggests that sponsors tend to choose projects with 
higher cash flow volatilities. On the other hand, sales volatility of sponsors is significantly higher 
than that of the non-sponsors. Sponsors are, on an average, larger in size; their projects are 
bigger than the segments of non-sponsors; they have higher leverage and free cash flows.19  
Sponsors have significantly lower R & D expenditure, higher tangibility compared to non-
sponsors. Mean (median) market to book values show that sponsors have less growth 
opportunities. Finally, sponsors are more likely to be diversified than non-sponsors. The findings 
are qualitatively similar for non-US subsample except for sales volatility, the mean of which is 
significantly lower for sponsors (0.15) at 10 percent level.  Also, the mean of R & D expenditure 
                                                 
18 Cash flow volatility of a few proxy project firms is extremely high, which affects mean calculation. I do not drop 
these observations; instead I use a rank measure of volatility difference in multivariate analyses that takes care of the 
outliers. 
19 Leverage of the sponsors is the weighted average leverage calculated as described in Section 4.3. 
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loses its significance in this subsample owing to the fact that a significant proportion of R&D is 
reported as zero.  Overall, the differences in the means and medians for sponsors and non-
sponsors are statistically significant for almost all the firm level variables for both US and non-
US subsamples suggesting that sponsors have different firm characteristics than non-sponsors. 
 5. 2 Multivariate Analysis  
 Univariate results in Section 5.1  provides some evidence that there are differences in 
volatilities, correlation and other characteristics across  sponsor and non-sponsor firms. In this 
section, I conduct multivariate analyses modeling the probability of project finance.   First, I 
conduct a firm level analysis on various subsamples of sponsor and project pairs within and 
outside the US. Next, I analyze how industry characteristics affect the choice of project finance.  
Then I model the probability of project finance for two subsamples of firms where extreme 
differences persist in firm and project volatilities as well as in the correlation between firm and 
project cash flows. The regressions include country dummies and robust standard errors 
clustered at either firm or industry level, when appropriate.  
 5.2.1 Volatility difference as a determinant of project finance: firm level analysis 
  I use a logistic regression to analyze whether the volatility difference between 
the firm and the project affects the probability of project finance. I construct a matched pair 
sample of case and control firms matched by industry at the three-digit SIC level and project 
initiation year. Each pair is grouped in a stratum and at least one firm in each stratum is a 
sponsor (case) firm. Given that sponsors comprise a very small fraction of the total sample 
(approximately 3 percent), using a matched pair produces more efficient estimate of the 
parameters compared to the full sample of firms (Manski and McFadden, 1981). Besides, since 
sponsors are clustered in some specific industries and project finance is more prevalent in recent 
24 
 
years, modeling the cluster produces more efficient estimates than using clustering correction for 
industry and year.   
Matching approach using a small sample of cases demands conditional (limited 
information maximum likelihood approach) logistic regression estimation. The asymptotic 
results of the conditional logistic model for stratified data rely on the number of strata rather than 
the total number of observations in the sample.20 Case-control matching allows me to study firm 
level differences in determining project finance choice, implicitly controlling for industry and 
year. The matching approach treats the matching variables as nuisance variables, and their 
effects are ‘integrated out’ and not estimated. This approach, just like the conditional differences 
in differences approach, allows the identification of the effects of the independent variables but it 
does not allow estimating the effects of the matching variables.  For example, I will be able to 
identify the effect of the volatility difference on the probability of project finance but I will not 
be able to estimate the effect of industry on the choice of project finance. I use the following 
conditional logistic regression model. 
Project Finance Dummyij = b1Volatility Differenceij+ b2Correlationij+ b3Firm’s CFVolatilityij + 
b4FirmSizeij + b5ProjectSizeij +b6Leverageij + b7FCFij + b8Diversifiedij + b9R&Dij+ 
b10Intangibilityij + b11MarketBookij + e,  
 where,  j(SIC-year stratum) = 1, 2, 3…. 
Table 6 estimates the effect of volatility difference between the firm and the project on 
the probability of project finance for US firms. Sponsors and non-sponsors are either single or 
multi -segment firms. The sample is further divided into the sponsors who invested in US 
                                                 
20 Though I started with a large number of US and non-US sponsors  and non-sponsors, the sample size reduces 
significantly when I match the sponsor with non-sponsor firms at the three-digit SIC level. The effective sample size 
varies from 213 to 78 strata for different subsamples, a size much lower than what is often used in corporate finance 
papers. 
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originated projects and those who invested in non-US projects.  The results using a rank measure 
of volatility differences are presented in the table. The findings are also robust to the use of 
continuous measure of volatilities. I include the control variables described in Section 4.3 as well 
as project country dummies, whenever appropriate. The statistical significance is based on robust 
standard errors clustered at the firm level.  
Leland (2007) shows that project finance is more likely when the magnitudes of the 
differences in cash flow volatilities of the project and firm are higher. Volatility difference 
creates negative financial synergies due to limited liability effect and provides incentive for the 
firm to separate its project. In column one, the coefficient on difference in CF volatility is 
positive (1.120) and significant at the 1 percent level for US sponsors who invested in projects 
within the US. A 10 percentage point increase in the volatility difference corresponds to 11.85 
percent increase in the odds of project finance investment by the US sponsors in the US.21 These 
findings are consistent with the hypothesis that higher volatility difference between the firm and 
the project/segment increases the probability of choosing project finance. The coefficient of 
correlation between cash flows of the firm and the project/segment is also positive (2.947) and 
significant suggesting that higher correlation between the firm and project/segment reduces 
diversification benefit from corporate finance and increases the probability of project finance. In 
column (1), a 10 percent increase in the correlation of cash flows increases the odds of project 
finance by 34.27 percent. Consistent with Leland (2007) and Flannery, et. al. (1993), these 
findings suggest that  if project’s cash flow volatility is much higher or lower than that of the 
                                                 
21 Odds is calculated as prob(Project Finance)/(1-prob(Project Finance)) = 
βXe , where X is the vector of explanatory 
variables and β is the vector of logistic regression coefficients.  Ceteris paribus, increasing the cash flow volatility 
difference by 10 percentage points increases odds for column (1) by
10.0120.1 ×e = 1.1185 or 11.85%. 
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firm, keeping the project separate hedges the firm against uncertain outcome and/or mitigates 
asset substitution problem, especially when diversification benefit is not that high. 
Among other variables in column one, the effects of firm size (0.550) and project size (1.312) 
on the probability of project finance are significant at 1 percent level. These results imply that 
the larger the firm, and the greater the investment required by the project, the more likely it is to 
be separated from the firm.  Since the leverage of a non-sponsor reflects the combined leverage 
of its segments, to have an equivalent comparison, I calculate a weighted average leverage for 
the sponsor. It is calculated as the sum of the average market leverage of the sponsor and the 
project weighted by their total assets. The effect of leverage is positive (0.918) and significant. It 
suggests that firms with high debt levels are likely to choose project finance.22 The coefficient 
estimate of free cash flow is significant and negative (0.60) for column one suggesting that the 
higher the firm’s free cash flow, the lower is the probability of project finance.  This finding is 
inconsistent with the view that project finance is a preferred mechanism to address the agency 
cost of free cash flow. Intangibility coefficient is positive (0.037) and significant at 5 percent 
level in column one. This finding supports the notion that US firms with high information 
asymmetry are likely to choose project finance to minimize the signaling cost to the lender or 
disseminate information in the market (Shah and Thakor, 1986; Krishnaswami and 
Subramaniam, 1999).  
Column five to eight report the estimations for US sponsors who invested in projects outside 
the US. Country factor can affect the cash flow/sales volatility of a project for this subsample. To 
mitigate this problem, I use a single segment firm in the project industry and country to proxy a 
non-US originated project and use project country dummies in the regression. Similarly, to 
                                                 
22 I also use un-weighted market leverage as an alternative measure. The estimate is qualitatively similar but not 
statistically significant for US sponsors with US projects. 
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account for the country effect in the volatility measure for a non-sponsor, I multiply the cash 
flow/sales volatility at the segment level by (σproject country/σUS), where σ measures the stock return 
volatility in the project country and in the US. These adjusted volatilities are used to calculate 
volatility differences from column five to eight. 
Similar to the  findings for the sponsors who invested in US projects only, the coefficient on 
difference in CF volatility is positive (1.849) and significant at 1 percent level in column five. 
The odds of project finance increases by 20.30 percent for a 10 percentage point increase in 
difference in CF volatility. The comparison of the odds between column one and five implies that 
a 10 percent increase in the volatility difference increases the probability of project investment 
outside the US more than within the US. The coefficient on correlation of CF is also positive 
(2.836) and significant at 1 percent level. The sign and significance for other control variables 
are similar to those for US sponsors who invested in projects within the US. 
Then I repeat the analysis using sales volatility difference measure; results are presented in 
column (3), (4), (7) and (8). In column three, the coefficient on difference in sales volatility is 
positive (1.001) and significant at 1 percent level.  This implies that for a 10 percent increase in 
the difference of sales volatility, the odds of investing in project finance increases by 10.53 
percent.  The results are consistent with the findings using cash flow volatility measure and 
suggest that the higher the difference in sales volatility between the firm and its project/segment, 
the higher is the likelihood of project finance. Using sales volatility difference does not 
qualitatively alter any of the key results.  
Next, I extend the analysis on the determinants of project finance for the subsample of non-
US firms and explore if the result holds. As before, if a project is originated outside the sponsor’s 
country, the proxy project is selected from the project country. Similarly, cash flow/ sales 
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volatility of non-sponsor’s segment is multiplied by the ratio of stock return volatility in the 
project country and the sponsor country. Both single and multi- segment firms are included in the 
regression. The estimation results are presented in Table 7.  As predicted, the higher is the 
volatility difference between the firm and the project, the higher is the probability of project 
finance. The coefficient on difference in CF volatility is positive and significant at 5 percent level 
for both non-US (0.118) and total sample (0.343) in column one and three, respectively. The 
odds of project finance increases by 1.18 percent (non-US) and 3.49 percent (All) for a 10 
percent increase in the volatility difference. Though consistent with the hypothesis, these odds 
are much lower than the odds of US sample (13.39 percent) in column two.  Lower odds could 
be attributed to two factors. First, non-US financial data from Datastream database are noisier.  
Second, adjusting cash flow/sales volatility by country factor and using country fixed effect do 
not adequately capture country level heterogeneity in the data. Similar to Table 6, the 
coefficients on correlation of cash flows, firm size, project size and leverage remain positive and 
statistically significant in each subsample and for sales volatility measure.  
 5.2.2 Industry level analysis of the determinants of project finance 
   As described in section 4.1, 48 percent of the sponsor firms are from power, 
transportation, oil and gas, and leisure and property industries. In this section, I investigate the 
characteristics that distinguish sponsor industries from non-sponsor industries.  
In the industry-level analysis, the sample is a pooled time series where industry-year 
represents a single observation. The dependent variable equals 1 if at least one firm in the 
industry invests in project finance (sponsor industry), zero otherwise. Unobserved heterogeneity 
is always a potential problem in pooled time series, especially in this sample where each industry 
contributes to multiple observations that are not independent from each other.  Either fixed effect 
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(industry specific errors are fixed over time) or random effect (industry specific errors vary 
randomly over time) models are used to address the issue of unobserved heterogeneity.  Fixed 
effect model needs variance in both dependent and independent variables to distinguish these 
variables from the fixed effects (Judge et al., 1985). Some industries repeatedly invest in many 
projects over the period while others do not invest in project finance at all, in other words, there 
is not enough variance in dependent variable within each industry. Therefore, a random effect 
model is more appropriate for this sample. 
Besides industry, the heterogeneity at the country level can affect the estimate in this 
pooled time series. For example, project finance is more prevalent form of organization structure 
in countries with higher risk and weaker investor protection (Subramanian, Tung, and Wang, 
2009). However, handling the unobserved heterogeneity at the country, industry and time 
dimensions requires three- way random effect estimation (Gibbons and Hedeker, 1997).  To 
mitigate the inherent complexity in the data, I run the analysis only on the subsamples of 
sponsors who have invested in projects in their home countries, model random effect for industry 
and use country and year fixed effects.  
The industry characteristics variables are median values calculated at the three-digit SIC 
level.23 In each year, I calculate median cash flow/sales volatility difference for each sponsor and 
non-sponsor industry. Project size is the natural log of industry median value of the project’s 
initial cost for a sponsor and the natural log of industry median book value of segment’s assets 
for a non-sponsor industry, respectively. Leverage for a sponsor industry is calculated as the sum 
of the median debt of the sponsor and the project weighted by their median total assets. Leverage 
for a non- sponsor industry is the median value of its debt scaled by total asset.   
                                                 
23 I repeat the analysis using mean values and find similar results. 
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Table 8 reports the estimation results of the regressors on the probability of project finance. 
The first column reports the coefficients of the industry level regression for 2,160 industries in 
the US. The coefficient on cash flow volatility difference is positive (1.109) and significant at 1 
percent level, which suggests that the difference in cash flow volatility between the median firm 
and the median project is significantly higher in sponsor industries.24 The coefficient on 
correlation of cash flow is positive (0.946) and significant at 1 percent level.  This finding 
implies that higher cash flow correlation between the median firm and the median project in an 
industry is positively related with the likelihood of project finance and is consistent with firm 
level analysis in Section 5.2.1.   
Among the control variables, the effects of industry size (0.554) and project size (1.313) are 
positive and significant suggesting that median firm in sponsor industry is larger than median 
firm in non-sponsor industry and median project of a sponsor industry is larger than the median 
segment of a non-sponsor industry. The coefficient on leverage is positive (0.816) and significant 
at 1 percent and consistent with the notion that project finance is one way to mitigate the 
underinvestment problem of high leverage (John and John, 1991; Flannery, et. al., 1993). The 
effect of free cash flow is positive (0.063) and significant at 5 percent and consistent with 
Subramanian, Tung and Wang (2009) which, in a cross-country sample, finds that the industries 
with high free cash flows are the ones likely to be engaged in project finance. This result on free 
cash flow is opposite to the findings in the firm level analysis in Table 6 which suggests that US 
sponsors have lower free cash flows compared to US non-sponsors. Finally, the higher the 
capital intensity of the median firm in an industry (0.039), the higher is the likelihood of project 
finance. 
                                                 
24 I also repeat the analysis for rank measure of volatility difference. The results are quantitatively similar.  
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Second column presents the results for non-US subsample. Coefficient on cash flow 
volatility difference is positive (0.638) and significant at 1 percent level.  In addition, the 
comparison between column one and two suggests that the effect of cash flow volatility 
difference is weaker in the case of non-US subsample (coefficient =0.638) than US subsample 
(coefficient = 1.109).  This implies that for a 10 percent increase in cash flow volatility 
difference between the median firm and the median project in an industry, the odds of project 
finance increase by 11.73 percent for US and 6.59 percent for non-US industries, respectively. 
Signs and statistical significance of other coefficients for non-US subsample are similar to those 
for US subsample. The key results do not change for the full sample either. The results are 
qualitatively similar for sales volatility difference measure as well. These findings imply that 
irrespective of the country, the magnitude of volatility difference between the median firm and 
the median project in sponsor industries is higher compared to that in non-sponsor industries and 
is also consistent with firm level analysis. 
In brief, the findings from Table 6 and 7 are consistent with the hypothesis that the 
probability of project finance is higher when there is a high volatility difference between the firm 
and project cash flows. Furthermore, industry level analysis in Table 8 shows that sponsor 
industries are significantly different from non-sponsor industries in terms of size, leverage, free 
cash flow and capital intensity, consistent with the notion than industry structure affects the 
choice of financing.  
 5.2.3 Interacting volatility and correlation: firm level analysis 
  The results thus far consistently indicate that for a given correlation between 
firm and project cash flows, the magnitude of cash flow/sales volatility difference between the 
sponsor and project is higher compared to that between the non-sponsor and its segment. In this 
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subsection, I explore two scenarios. First, I examine the effect of correlation on the probability of 
project finance if cash flow/sales volatility between the firm and the project is low and similar. 
Next, I investigate the effect of correlation on the probability of project finance if cash flow/sales 
volatility between the firm and the project is different.  
 A.   Similar (low) volatility × correlation of cash flows between firm and  project 
  Low and similar cash flow volatility between the firm and the project implies 
that they have similar risk level and therefore, the ‘walk-away’ option is less valuable to the 
sponsor (Leland, 2007).  Since the loss from limited liability effect is minimal if the assets are 
combined, there is a low incentive for the firm to keep its project separate. In addition to that, as 
the correlation between the firm and project cash flows decreases, combining assets increases 
financial synergies through the leverage effect. Thus, when the cash flow volatility of the firm 
and the project is low and similar, the likelihood of project finance decreases as correlation 
between firm and project cash flows decreases.  
 The primary explanatory variable in this conditional logistic regression is an interaction term 
– low and similar volatility × correlation. It is constructed as follows. First I divide firms and 
projects/segments in the sample in volatility quartiles. Each firm and each project/segment is 
assigned a rank from 1(lowest) to 4(highest).  Low and similar volatility equals one if both the 
sponsor and the project in the pair rank either 1 or 2. Similar procedure is followed for non-
sponsor and segment pairs. Correlation is a continuous variable that measures the correlation of 
cash flows/ sales between sponsor and project and non-sponsor and segments using cash flows 
for five years preceding the project initiation year. All analyses are conducted on the firm level. 
The estimation results are reported in Table 9. As expected, the probability of project finance 
is positively related to correlation of cash flows given cash flow volatility between the firm and 
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the project is similar. In column one, the coefficient of similar volatility × correlation is positive 
(0.673) and significant at 1 percent level for the US sample. It implies that the probability of 
project finance decreases with a decrease in correlation of cash flows. Since the coefficient of an 
interaction term in a non-linear model does not fully capture the interaction effect, it is rather 
useful to interpret the result of the interaction in terms of odds ratio (Ai and Norton, 2003).  For 
example, when similar volatility equals one, decreasing cash flow correlation by 10 percent 
reduces the probability of project finance by 9.13 percent.25  Other coefficients in column one 
indicate that large US firms (coefficient = 0.528) have higher tendency to choose project finance; 
larger projects (coefficient = 0.800) are more likely to be project financed and firms with higher 
leverage (coefficient = 0.609) are more likely to engage in project finance.  Further, the 
coefficient on free cash flow (-0.067) is significantly negative, implying that firms with higher 
cash flows have a lower likelihood of project finance. The findings are qualitatively similar for 
sales volatility measure. 
Column two reports the results for non-US firms.  With similar volatilities between the 
sponsor and the project, the odds for project finance decreases by 6.56 percent for a 10 percent 
decrease in the correlation between firm and project cash flows. The weaker odds may be the 
result of a noisier volatility measure for non-US sample. In general, the findings are similar 
except that coefficient of free cash flow loses its significance, possibly due to a smaller 
subsample. Findings for the full sample are qualitatively similar to that of the US and non-US 
subsamples. 
 
 
                                                 
25 Using the coefficient estimates in column one,  when similar volatility equals 1, the odds ratio is [1-  e(0.285)(-0.10) 
+(0.673)(-0.10)] = 0.0913, which corresponds to a 9.13 percent decrease in the odds of project finance for a 10 percent 
decline in the correlation between firm and project cash flows.    
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 B.   Different volatility × high correlation of cash flows between firm and project 
  If the project’s cash flow volatility is different than the firm’s, separating the 
project hedges the firm against uncertain outcome and allow it to raise debt optimally for both 
entities (Leland, 2007).  Volatility difference also creates financing distortions and asset 
substitution for the combined entity (John and John, 1991; Flannery, et.al, 1993) and provides 
incentives for the firm to separate its project. Further, correlation among the cash flow from the 
firm and the project is negatively related to the diversification benefit of a combined entity.  
Since high volatility difference increases limited liability effect and high correlation reduces 
leverage effect, the probability of observing project finance should be the highest in the 
subsample of firms with different volatility and high correlation.  
The primary explanatory variable in this model is different volatility × high correlation, an 
interaction between two binary variables. It is constructed as follows. Different volatility equals 
one if the volatility difference between the firm and the project are in the highest or lowest 
volatility difference quartile and high correlation equals one if the correlation between the firm 
and project cash flows is higher than the median correlation value of the sample. Thus different 
volatility × high correlation equals one when different volatility = 1 and high correlation = 1.  
The estimation results are reported in Table 10. The effect of different volatility × high 
correlation on the probability of project finance is positive for US subsample (0.218) in column 
one and full sample (0.213) in column three. For a change from low to high correlation, the odds 
of project finance increases by 35.12 percent for US subsample and 36.07 percent for full 
sample. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the probability of project finance 
is the highest in the subsample of firms with different volatility × high correlation. However, the 
results are significant only at 10 percent level. Though the asymptotic results of the conditional 
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logistic model rely on the number of strata, asymmetric sample of response variable affects the 
power of the test. For example, there are only 88 project finance observations (Table 4: Panel C) 
in different volatility × high correlation subsample compared to 19,797 observations for the 
entire sample. It implies a conditional probability of only 0.44 percent (88/19,797) of observing a 
project finance choice in column three. The coefficient is not significant for non-US subsample 
since it has fewer than 40 observations (not reported in the paper). The results for the main 
explanatory variable and control variables are quantitatively similar for sales volatility measure. 
Overall, multivariate analyses in this section provide strong evidence that the volatility 
difference between the firm and the project is positively related to the probability of project 
finance and are also consistent with Leland (2007). A similar relation is also established in an 
industry level analysis. Furthermore, high correlation between firm and project cash flows and 
different volatility between the firm and the project provides the strongest incentive for project 
finance. When the volatility between the firm and the project is similar, the probability of project 
finance is sensitive and positively related to the correlation of firm and project cash flows.  Next 
section, I show that the findings are robust to various proxies for projects, alternate specification 
of the conditional logistic model as well as to the self selection issues related to the firm’s project 
finance decision. 
 
6.  Alternative Specification, Subsample Tests and Robustness Checks 
 6.1 Different Proxies, Various Measures of Volatility and Subsample Tests 
 As a first robustness check, I examine whether the results are sensitive to the way I 
construct the sample of proxy projects. If there are multiple proxy projects for a single project, I 
create multiple observations of volatility differences between the sponsor and the project. Since 
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this measure could overstate the number of observations for sponsor and project pairs, I define 
other measures. First, I take the average cash flow volatility of all matches and use it as a single 
observation. Second, if there are multiple matches, I keep the proxy project whose size is the 
closest to project cost (the indicator for project size). I repeat the tests with redefined proxies and 
the results are quantitatively similar to those from Table 6 to Table 10.  
Second, I explore whether the results might be due to the way I calculate volatility 
difference for non-sponsors. In the main tests, I include both single and multi-segment non-
sponsors. By construction, the volatility of the segment of a single-segment firm is its own 
volatility and therefore, volatility difference between the non-sponsor and its segment is 
understated.  Alternatively, I use industry adjusted median cash flow volatility at three-digit SIC 
level to proxy for the volatility of the segment for a single segment non-sponsor firm. The results 
are qualitatively similar.  I also repeat the multivariate analysis on the subsample of multi 
segment non-sponsor firms to mitigate the sample construction issue discussed here. The results 
are reported in Table 11: Panel A. The basic results remain qualitatively unchanged. 
Then, I explore the cases where multiple sponsors invest in a single project. To illustrate the 
issue, suppose, a petro chemical project has two sponsors – a petrochemical company and a 
bank. The cash flow/ sales volatility difference between the bank and the project is likely to be 
higher than that between the petrochemical firm and the project. However, it is not clear whether 
the inclusion of projects with multiple sponsors strengthens or weakens the result.  I exclude the 
projects with multiple sponsors and repeat the test on the subsamples of US and non-US firms. 
The results are presented in Table 11: Panel B and are consistent with the hypothesis that for any 
given correlation, the cash flow volatility difference between the sponsor and the project 
increases the likelihood of project finance. 
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In the main test, I exclude sponsors who trade in foreign stock exchanges for two reasons. 
First, firms that cross list differ in their ex ante characteristics and ex post behaviors compared to 
the firms that are traded only on a single exchange. Second, firms also differ depending on where 
they cross-list.  For example, Pagano, et. al. (2002) finds that European firms that are cross listed 
in the US are larger, have recently become public, use equity as a means to rapid expansion and  
expand their foreign sales after listing and are usually from the technology sector. On the other 
hand, firms that are listed in more than one European exchanges increase their leverage right 
after listing, however, they do not expand rapidly.  Rapid expansion may affect the sales 
volatility of the cross listed firms and generate some bias due to the lack of appropriate match 
between sponsor and non-sponsor firms. However, as robustness, I include the firms that are 
traded in foreign stock exchange and the repeat the tests for US and non-US subsamples in Table 
11: Panel C. The results are not qualitatively different from that of Table 7. 
 
Findings from industry level analysis in Table 10 suggest that industries with high capital 
intensity have higher probabilities of project finance. Similarly one may argue that firms that 
undertake project finance are systematically different in capital intensity or other firm 
characteristics from the firms that do corporate finance. In other words, there might be some 
unobserved heterogeneity at the firm level. To investigate this, I construct a sample of sponsor 
and non-sponsor firms matched on tangibility (net PPE) within each industry. Projects and their 
proxies are also matched on the same variable. Then I repeat the tests on the US subsample with 
projects within the US.   The results are presented in Table 11: Panel D and are qualitatively 
similar to those in Table 6, 7 and 8.  
To address the concerns related to off-balance sheet accounting, in 2003 the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued FIN 46, which requires firms to consolidate special 
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purpose entities if they are primary beneficiaries of these entities. Zhang (2009) finds that S&P 
500 firms that previously used special purpose entities to meet certain financial reporting 
objectives responded to FIN 46 by reducing book leverage or investment in special purpose 
entities. It implies that FIN 46 is also likely to reduce investment in project finance and book 
leverage of the sponsors. The impact of FIN 46 can only weaken my result due to a smaller 
sample of sponsor firms if firms decrease their investments in project finance after 2003. The 
consolidation of leverage also does not bias my result since I have used sponsor-project weighted 
leverage for the entire sample period from 1999 to 2008 for all my tests. As additional 
robustness, I repeat the tests on the sample of US sponsors from 1999 to 2003 and the results are 
quantitatively similar to Table 7. I also obtain information from the footnote of 10K filings about 
US sponsors that have consolidated the projects in their balance sheet and repeat the tests by 
excluding those firms. The results are reported in Table 11: Panel E and indicate that the 
difference of cash flow/sale volatility between the firm and the project is positively related to the 
likelihood of project finance.   
Finally, I repeat the tests on the identical number of observations of cash flow and sales 
volatility, presented in Table 11: Panel F and find evidence supporting the hypothesis that the 
probability of project finance increases in the volatility difference between the firm and project 
cash flows. 
 6.2 Alternative Econometric Specification: Firm Level Analysis 
 In this section, I investigate whether the positive relations between the difference in 
cash flow/sale volatility and the choice of project finance are robust to different econometric 
specification. First, I repeat the tests in Table 6, 7, 9 and 10 using linear probability models. 
Next, I run a firm level random effects logistic regression on a pooled panel using the sample as 
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in Table 7. The dependent variable equals one if the firm is a sponsor, i.e., invests in project 
finance.   
I use linear probability model because it explicitly models firm and industry fixed effects 
which are integrated out in the conditional logistics model. Moreover, the interpretation of 
interaction variables used in Table 9 and 10 are straight forward in a linear probability model.  
Though using a linear probability speciation on non-linear model is not desirable because the 
predicted values fall outside the zero/one range, here I am primarily interested in the sign and 
significance level of the coefficients. To correct for the heteroscedasticity in the error terms, I 
follow two-stage linear probability model, as suggested by Goldberger (1964).  The results are 
presented in table 12. The findings are statistically significant and qualitatively similar to those 
in Tables 6, 7, 9 and 10. 
Next, I repeat the tests on US and non-US subsamples and the entire sample using random 
effect model for the following two reasons. First reason is similar to the one discussed in section 
5.2.2.  Second, fixed-effects models typically produce biased estimates of the fixed effects when 
the time period is relatively short, T <10 (Heckman, 1981).  Though my sample period extends 
over a period of 18 years, some of the firms have fewer than 10 observations because they are 
merged with other firms or did not survive or firm data are not available.  
The nature of the project finance data is such that there could be unobserved heterogeneity at 
the country, industry and firm level and as such requires three- level random effect estimation, 
even without modeling time dimension (Gibbons and Hedeker, 1997).  I model industry and firm 
effects as random effects and use year and country fixed effects.26 Table 13 reports the 
estimation results of the regressors on the probability of project finance.  Overall findings 
                                                 
26 This approximate solution has little advantage over the traditional logistic regression (Gibbons and Hedeker, 
1997), therefore, I use this model only as a robustness check.  
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suggest that the probability of project finance is higher when there is a high volatility between 
firm and project cash flows, as predicted in Hypothesis one.  The comparison among column one 
and two also suggests that the effect of cash flow volatility difference is stronger for US 
subsample (coefficient = 0.949) than for non-US subsample (coefficient =0.583). It implies that 
for a 10 percent increase in cash flow volatility difference, odds of project finance increases by 
9.95 percent for US and 6.00 percent for non-US sample, respectively. The coefficient on 
correlation of cash flow is positive and significant for both subsamples. The results are 
significant and qualitatively similar for the full sample and also for sales volatility difference 
measure.   
 6.3 Panel Data Selection Model: Firm Level Analysis 
 Industry level analysis shows that industry characteristics affect the probability of 
project finance. The industry which usually finances through project finance, institutional 
arrangements and the experience to set up a project is already available to the firms in that 
industry. Therefore, firms operating in these industries may not be randomly selected.  For 
example, a firm in oil drilling or pipeline industry might self-select to engage in project finance 
because it is easier (lower transaction cost) to finance new activities this way compared to a firm 
in an industry with a low probability of project finance. This type of endogeneity arising from 
self selection creates a bias to the estimate.27 Hence I run a random effect selection model on 
pooled panel data. Section 5.2.2 describes the reasons for using a random effect model. Though 
simulation is the natural candidate to integrate out the random effect from a selection model, 
Wooldridge (1995) proposes a two stage procedure.  In the first stage, I run cross-sectional probit 
models separately for each year and generate inverse mills ratio and other coefficient estimates. 
                                                 
27 Conditional logistic model used in the main test is the only parametric approach that overcomes the bias if the 
appropriate matching is used (Heckman, 1998). 
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Second stage is a fixed effect liner regression as itititiit Xay νλρβ +++=
^
'  and forms the basis 
for estimation of β and ρ. 
The selection model in the first stage analyzes how industries self-select into project 
finance (PF) industries. The dependent variable in the selection equation is PF Industry Dummy 
that equals 1 if at least one firm in the three-digit SIC industry has invested in project finance, 
and zero otherwise. The independent variables are median values for industry minus firm 
characteristics variables.  I estimate the second stage using OLS regressions only on the sub-
samples of industries that have selected themselves to be in PF industries. The dependent 
variable is PF Firm Dummy that takes a value of one if a firm invests in project finance.  The 
independent variables are difference in cash flow volatility, correlation of cash flows and other 
firm characteristics. The findings are reported in Table 14. The coefficient on difference in cash 
flow volatility is positive (1.123) and significant for US sample in column two and in other 
subsamples (column four and five) after controlling for selection bias.    
 
7.  Conclusion 
This research adds to the growing body of literature that examines the determinants of 
optimal organizational structure.  The existing literature examines how operational and financial 
synergies determine the scope of the firm.  This paper contributes to the recent trend of studies 
that tries to explain the existence of various innovative financial contracts, such as project 
finance, in light of traditional theories.  
The unique feature of this analysis is that I am able to circumvent two major difficulties 
of the empirical research on project finance, namely the inability to observe project cash flows 
and the unobservability of the projects of the non-sponsors. My findings provide strong evidence 
that the higher the difference in the cash flow (sales) volatility of the firm and the project, the 
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higher is the likelihood of project finance and is consistent with Leland (2007). The probability 
of project finance increases in correlation between the firm and project cash flows when the cash 
flow (sales) volatility of the project is low and similar to that of the firm.  Furthermore, the 
likelihood of project finance is the highest when the correlation between sponsor and project 
cash flows is high and the risk of the project is different from the risk of the sponsor.  In addition 
to that, industry characteristics influence the choice between project finance and corporate 
finance. The findings are robust to different definitions of project cash flows and volatility 
measures. The results are also robust to alternate econometric specification of the model and 
potential self section bias.    
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Appendix A1  
 
Distribution of Projects with Multiple Sponsors  
                 Projects 
 
# of Sponsors US Non-US 
1  245 213 
2 46 41 
More than 2 14 18 
 
Total 
 
305 
 
272 
 
 
Distribution of Sponsors with Multiple Projects 
                 # of Sponsor firms 
 
# of Projects US Non-US 
21 0 1 
18 1 0 
17 0 1 
15 1 1 
14 0 1 
10 0 2 
9 0 4 
8 0 2 
7 1 3 
6 0 5 
5 0 2 
4 10 12 
3 21 24 
2 67 45 
1 139 97 
   
Total 240 200 
 
  
A2 
 
 
Appendix A2  
Sample Construction Steps for Sponsor Firms and Projects 
 US sample Non-US sample 
 # Sponsors # Projects  # Sponsors # Projects  
Initial sample of sponsor firms and projects from GPF 
database (1990-2008) 
1,014 988 5,536 4,134 
Less:     
    Private sponsors and sponsors traded in foreign 
exchanges 
198 147 1,538 857 
Cancelled/conventionally financed, rumored/pipeline,         
defaulted  projects 
52 79 834 640 
Recently announced but non operational projects and      
projects not having limited/non-recourse feature  
as described in project synopses 
78 73 462 594 
     Project with data inconsistencies 53 63 186 209 
Total sponsor firms and projects from GPF database 633 626 2,516 1,834 
Less: 
    
     Sponsor- project pair without proxy projects 221 209 967 1,015 
Sponsor- project pair without firm characteristics data       53 28 629 244 
   Sponsor – project pair without a non-sponsor -segment 
pair (with firm characteristics data) 
119 84 720 303 
Final sample of sponsor firms and projects 240 305 200 272 
 
 
Segment Distribution of Sponsors and non-Sponsor Firms 
                 Sponsor               Non-Sponsor 
 
 US Non-US US Non-US 
Single Segment 84 71 869 1,235 
 
Multi-Segment 156 129 998 914 
 
Total  240 200 1,867 2,149 
 
 
  
Table 1:  Top 25 Project Sponsors by Country and Industry 
 
Table 1 provides the sample distribution top 25 of 440 US and Non –US public sponsors by their countries and 
industries. Last column presents the number of projects in the sample undertaken by them. There are total 577 
projects during the sample period from 1990 to 2008.  
 
 Project Sponsor(s) 
Country  
of the Sponsor 
Industry 
 of  the Sponsor 
# of Projects 
1 Petroleo Brasileiro SA Brazil Power 21 
2 AES Corp USA Power 18 
3 Marubeni Corp Japan Power 17 
4 Calpine Corp USA Power 15 
5 Mitsui & Co Ltd Japan Petrochemicals 15 
6 Mitsubishi Corp Japan Power 14 
7 Babcock & Brown Ltd Australia Leisure & Property 10 
8 Acciona SA Spain Power 10 
9 Sumitomo Corp Japan Power 9 
10 Fomento de Construcciones Spain Leisure & Property 9 
11 Tenaga Nasional Bhd Malaysia Power 9 
12 Vinci SA France Leisure & Property 9 
13 SABIC Saudi Arabia Petrochemicals 8 
14 Empresas ICA SAB de CV Mexico Water & Sewerage 8 
15 OAO Gazprom Russian Fed Oil & Gas 7 
16 Bouygues SA France Leisure & Property 7 
17 Jarvis PLC UK Leisure & Property 7 
18 Enron Corp USA Oil & Gas 7 
19 ITOCHU Corp Japan Industry 6 
20 Cia Vale do Rio Doce SA Brazil Industry 6 
21 Obrascon Huarte Lain SA Spain Transportation 6 
22 Bilfinger Berger AG Germany Transportation 6 
23 Dragados y Construcciones SA Spain Transportation 6 
24 Sacyr Vallehermoso SA Spain Transportation 5 
25 Total SA France Oil & Gas 5 
 
 
  
Table 2:  Distribution of Projects by Industry and by Year 
 
Table 2 provides the distribution of projects by two-digit SIC code industries over the range of the sample period from 1990 to 2008. The sample comprises 577 
projects undertaken by 440 US and non-US sponsors. Percentage column is the percentage of all projects that belongs to a two-digit industry classification. 
 
2-Digit 
SIC 
Industry 1990-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 2006 2007-2008 Total Percentage 
49 Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services 39 93 124 19 11 286 49.57% 
29 Petroleum Refining 11 23 26 6 1 67 11.61% 
13 Oil and Gas Extraction 0 14 23 3 4 44 7.63% 
48 Telecommunication 13 16 2 0 0 31 5.37% 
28 Chemicals and Allied Products 3 8 8 2 4 25 4.33% 
36 Electronic and Other Electrical Equipment 10 10 1 0 1 22 3.81% 
51 Wholesale Trade-non-durable Goods 7 10 2 0 0 19 3.29% 
10 Metal Mining 0 2 8 1 2 13 2.25% 
33 Primary Metal Industries 0 1 7 1 1 10 1.73% 
12 Coal Mining 0 0 8 0 0 8 1.39% 
35 Industrial and Commercial Machinery 4 3 1 0 0 8 1.39% 
63 Insurance Carriers 2 0 3 0 0 5 0.87% 
40 Railroad transportation 0 0 0 4 0 4 0.69% 
45 Transportation by Air 1 2 0 0 1 4 0.69% 
73 Business Services 0 1 3 0 0 4 0.69% 
99 Nonclassifiable Establishments 0 0 4 0 0 4 0.69% 
16 Heavy Construction other than Building 0 0 2 0 1 3 0.52% 
20 Food and Kindred Products 1 2 0 0 0 3 0.52% 
38 Search and Navigation Equipment 3 0 0 0 0 3 0.52% 
79 Amusement and Recreation Services 0 2 1 0 0 3 0.52% 
87 Engineering Services 0 0 3 0 0 3 0.52% 
37 Transportation Equipment 0 2 0 0 0 2 0.35% 
42 Motor Freight Transportation 0 0 2 0 0 2 0.35% 
46 Pipelines, Except Natural Gas 0 1 1 0 0 2 0.35% 
50 Wholesale Trade - Durable Goods 0 0 1 0 1 2 0.35% 
 Total 94 190 230 36 27 577 100.00% 
  
Table 3:  Descriptive Statistics on Projects during 1990 -2008 
 
The sample consists of 577 US and non-US project deals during the sample period from 1990 to 2008. Panel A 
provides summery statistics on project characteristics. Variable definitions are taken from SDC database. Project Cost 
is the overall cost of a project. Equity Ratio is the percentage of total capitalization that is equity. Debt ratio is the 
percentage of debt in total capitalization. A Sponsor is a firm who has a direct interest in the project such as a 
contractor, supplier, purchaser or user of the project's output or facilities or has an indirect interest.  Panel B describes 
the financing structure of the project deals in the sample. Sponsor Equity is the total amount of project funding, 
obtained through equity contributed by the sponsor(s). Subordinated Equity is the total amount of funding obtained 
through an equity subordinated loan to finance the project. Standby Equity is the total amount of project funding 
obtained through a standby equity facility. Syndicated Loan is the total amount of project funding obtained through a 
syndicated loan -a credit facility made available by a group of banks (syndicate) in pre-defined proportions under the 
same facility. Subordinated Debt is the total amount of funding raised through a subordinated loan to finance the 
project. Subordinated Bond is the total amount of project funding obtained through a subordinated bond/note issue. A 
subordinated bond is junior in claim on assets to other debt. Supplier Credit is the total amount of project funding 
through a supplier credit. A supplier credit is a financing agreement between buyer and supplier under which the 
latter agrees to accept deferred payment terms from the buyer and funds itself by discounting or selling the buyer's 
bills or promissory notes with a bank in its own country. Percentage of the sample is the percentage of different types 
of financing observed in the sample of 577 projects.  
 
Panel A: Project Characteristics for the Overall Sample 
 Mean Median Std. Dev Min Max 
Sample 
Size 
Project Cost (Million $) 998.49 395.00 2,204.89 1.50 26,000.00 577 
Equity Ratio (%) 20.24 20.00 18.39 0.00 74.00 577 
Debt Ratio (%) 79.76 80.00 19.00 0.40 100.00 577 
# of Sponsors 1.11 1.00 0.40 1.00 5.00 577 
 
 
Panel B: Project Financing for the Overall Sample 
(Million $) Mean Median Std. Dev Min Max 
% of the 
sample 
Sponsors’ Equity 259.84 132.53 1,319.47 0.00 26,000.00 72.44% 
Standby Equity 69.71 30.00 81.88 4.84 200.00 0.87% 
Subordinated Equity 161.50 161.50 115.26 80.00 243.00 0.35% 
Syndicated Loan 644.45 200.00 1,653.91 0.00 20,000.00 81.46% 
Subordinated Debt 122.92 101.31 126.05 6.60 399.63 1.39% 
Subordinated Bond 508.48 316.96 541.62 100.00 1,300.00 0.69% 
Supplier Credit 161.25 152.50 107.11 40.00 300.00 0.69% 
 
  
Table 4: Distribution of Volatility and Correlation Measures 
 
This table reports the distribution of volatility difference and correlation of cash flows between the sponsor and the 
proxy project and the non-sponsor and the segment from 1990  to 2008. The sample consists of 631 firm year 
observations for sponsor & proxy project pair and 13,406 firm year observations for multi segment non-sponsor & 
segment pair.  Cash flow (sales) volatility difference is the absolute value of the difference in the standard deviation 
of cash flows (sales) between the sponsor (non-sponsor) and proxy project (segment). Correlation is a dummy which 
takes a value of 1/0 (high/low) if the sponsor and the project or the non-sponsor and the segment are from the same 
(different) industry. Cash flow volatility difference is divided in quartiles as 1 being the lowest and 4 being the 
highest volatility quartile, respectively. Similar Volatility takes a value of 1 if the volatility difference falls in quartile 
2 or 3 and Different Volatility takes a value of 1 if the volatility difference falls in quartile 1 or 4. Panel A reports the 
frequency and percentage of observations where volatility of the sponsor (non-sponsor) is higher than that of the 
project (segment). Panel B reports the frequencies and percentage of high and low correlations of cash flows between 
the sponsor (non-sponsor) and the proxy project (segment). Panel C shows the distribution of interaction between 
volatility difference and correlation of cash flows.   
 
Panel A: Distribution of Volatility Difference 
 Cash flow Volatility Sales Volatility 
Volatility Difference  Total obs. % of sample Total obs. % of sample 
Sponsor  > Project  631 
210 
33.28% 
545 
545 
100% 
Non-sponsor > Segment 13,406 
4,268 
31.84% 
12,356 
16,448 
100.00% 
 
 
Panel B: Distribution of Correlation of Cash Flows 
 
  Correlation Total obs. % of sample 
Sponsor & Project  
High 
631 
152 
24.09% 
Low 
479 
75.91% 
Non-sponsor & Segment 
High 
13,406 
1,034 
7.71% 
Low 
12,372 
92.29% 
 
 
Panel C: Distribution of  Cash Flow Volatility Difference × Correlation 
 Low Correlation × Similar Volatility High Correlation × Different Volatility 
  Total obs. % of sample Total obs. % of sample 
Sponsor  & Project  479 
187 
39.04% 
152 
88 
57.89% 
Non-sponsor & Segment 12,372 
7,483 
60.48% 
1,034 
928 
89.75% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Table 5:  Differences in Sponsor and Non-sponsor Characteristics 
The sample consists of 631 firm-year observations for sponsors and 19,797 firm-year observations for non- sponsors within and outside the US during the period 
from 1990 to 2008. The sample includes both single and multi segment firms. Cash flow (sales) volatility difference is the absolute value of the difference in the 
standard deviation of cash flows (sales) between the sponsor and the proxy project and the non-sponsor and its segment. Correlation of cash flows between sponsor 
and proxy-project and non-sponsor and segment pairs is calculated using cash flows for five years preceding the project initiation year. Firm Size is the natural log 
of the book value of the total assets of sponsors and non-sponsors. Project Size is the natural log of project’s initial cost for a sponsor and the natural log of the book 
value of the segment’s assets for a non-sponsor, respectively. Leverage equals to the book value of long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities divided by the 
book value of debt and market value of common equity. Leverage of a sponsor is calculated as the sum of the average debt of the sponsor and the project weighted 
by their total assets. Free Cash Flow is calculated by subtracting interest expense, taxes, preferred and common dividends from operating income before 
depreciation scaled by total assets. Diversified is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm operates in more than one business segments. Intangibility is 
one minus property, plant, equipment (PPE) plus inventory scaled by total asset. Market to Book is the book value of debt plus market value of common equity 
divided by total assets. All variables in Panel B are winsorized at the 2nd and 98th percentiles.  ***, **, and * indicate significance in the difference in means and 
medians between sponsors and non-sponsors at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Differences in Volatilities and Correlation 
 Sponsor & Project Non-sponsor & Segment 
 
Obs. 
% of sample 
Mean Median Min Max 
Obs. 
% of sample 
Mean Median Min Max 
Difference in cash flow volatility 
631 
3.09% 
0.54 *** 0.09*** 0.15 1.80 
19,797 
96.91% 
0.12 0.02 0.00 1.13 
Difference in sales volatility 
545 
3.21% 
0.16*** 0.11*** 0.06 1.33 
16,448 
96.79% 
0.06 0.05 0.00 1.07 
Correlation of cash flows 
631 
3.09% 
0.34*** 0.25*** 0.12 0.78 
19,797 
96.91% 
0.22 0.18 0.07 0.65 
Panel B: Differences in Other Firm Characteristics 
 Sponsor  US Sample Non-Sponsor Sponsor Non-US Sample Non-Sponsor 
 
Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean Median 
CF Volatility 380 0.07 ** 0.03*** 12,139 0.14 0.06 251 0.22*** 0.12*** 7,658 0.26 0.15 
Sales Volatility 338 0.20*** 0.13  ** 9,303 0.16 0.15 207 0.15  * 0.13   * 7,145 0.16 0.14 
Firm Size 380 7.66*** 7.61*** 12,139 5.45 5.30 251 8.05*** 7.02*** 7,658 4.16 4.09 
Project Size 380 6.90*** 5.98*** 12,139 4.60 4.38 251 6.89*** 6.55*** 7,658 3.79 3.73 
Leverage 380 0.42*** 0.40*** 12,139 0.18 0.14 251 0.39*** 0.35*** 7,658 0.18 0.15 
Free Cash Flow 380 0.12  **   0.08  ** 12,139 0.04 0.02 251 0.15*** 0.10  ** 7,658 0.11 0.08 
R & D 374 0.01***    0.00 12,125 0.02 0.00 242   0.01   0.00 7,646 0.01 0.00 
Intangibility 376 0.07*** 0.05*** 12,131 0.10 0.08 245   0.04   *   0.02 7,650 0.02  0.02 
Market to Book 380 1.50  ** 1.32*** 12,139 1.56 1.45 248 1.32***  1.40*** 7,649 1.76 1.45 
Diversified  388 2.65*** 2.00*** 12,135 1.81 1.00 239 1.90***   1.00 7,645 1.35 1.00 
   
Table 6: Conditional Logistic Regression Modeling the Likelihood of Project Finance by US Sponsors 
 
This table presents estimated coefficient from conditional logistic regressions explaining the probability of project finance for US sponsors and non-sponsors during 
the period from1990 to 2008. The sample includes both single and multi segment firms.  In each matched pair stratum, matched by industry and project 
announcement year, dependent variable equals 1 if a firm invests in project finance. Cash flow (sales) volatility difference is the absolute value of the difference in 
the standard deviation of cash flows (sales) between the sponsor and proxy project and the non-sponsor and its segment. Cash flow (sales) volatility of non-US 
segment is adjusted by the ratio of stock return volatility in the project country and the US. Rank measure is based on volatility difference quartiles where 1(4) is 
the lowest (highest) volatility quartile. Correlation dummy takes a value of (1/0) if the correlation between cash flows of the sponsor and  project or the non-sponsor 
and its segment is higher (lower) than the median correlation value of the sample. Diversified is the sales-based Herfindahl Index calculated as the sum of the 
squared market share of each firm in its three -digit SIC code industry. Other variables are as described in Table 5. First four columns report the estimate for 
sponsors who invested in projects in the US; last four columns report the estimate for sponsors who invested in projects originated outside the US and  also include 
project country dummies. Standard errors accounts for clustering at firm level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 US Sponsor - US Project US Sponsor – Non-US Project 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Difference  in CF Volatility (Rank) 1.120*** 0.949***   1.849 ** 0.983 **   
Difference  in Sales Volatility (Rank)   1.001*** 0.843***   1.092 ** 0.831 ** 
Correlation of  CF (continuous) 2.947***  2.880***  2.836 **  2.302 **   
Correlation (1/0)  2.417***  2.275***  2.832**  2.234** 
         
Firm Characteristics         
Firm’s  CF  Volatility 0.297 0.402       0.253 0.345   
Firm’s  Sales  Volatility   0.130 0.068      0.134      0.025 
Firm Size 0.550*** 0.649*** 0.608*** 0.691*** 0.456*** 0.457*** 0.892*** 0.728*** 
Project Size 1.312*** 1.453*** 1.337*** 1.498*** 1.763*** 1.738*** 1.526*** 1.325*** 
Leverage 0.918***   0.014*** 0.929*** 0.025*** 0.184***      0.045*** 0.835*** 0.028*** 
Free Cash Flow  -0.060*** -0.166*** -0.017*** -0.180*** -0.056 **     -0.167 ** -0.053 **     -0.234 ** 
Diversified    -0.004 -0.165 0.209 0.738    -0.013      -0.125     0.176  0.678 
Research & Development    -1.018 -1.405 -0.033 -0.093    -1.089      -1.485    -0.738      -0.056 
Intangibility 0.037*** 0.226 0.198 0.311   0.019 **  0.223     0.167   0.537 
Market to Book 0.000 0.000 0.025 0.001      0.145   0.027     0.045   0.023 
         
Firm Level Clustering    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country Dummies  No  No  Yes  Yes 
# Sponsors’ Firm-year Obs.  235  228  145  110 
# Firm-year Obs.  8,993  5,345  3,291  3,958 
# of Strata  123  101  95  78 
         
χ
2 148.86 149.10 79.79 77.19 148.86 147.98 79.77 78.34 
P - Value       <.000 <.000 <.000 <.000 <.000 <.000 <.000 <.000 
   
Table 7: Conditional Logistic Regression Modeling the Likelihood of Project Finance by All Sponsors 
 
This table presents estimated coefficient from conditional logistic regressions explaining the probability of project finance during the period from1990 to 2008. US 
and non-US denote the two subsamples of firms; all represents the total sample. The sample includes both single and multi segment firms.  In each matched pair 
stratum, matched by industry and project announcement year, dependent variable equals 1 if a firm invests in project finance. Cash flow (sales) volatility difference 
is the absolute value of the difference in the standard deviation of cash flows (sales) between the sponsor and proxy project and the non-sponsor and its segment. If 
a project is originated outside the sponsor’s country, cash flow (sales) volatility of the non-sponsor’s segment is adjusted by the ratio of stock return volatility in the 
project country and the sponsor country. Rank measure is based on volatility difference quartiles where 1(4) is the lowest (highest) volatility quartile. Correlation of 
cash flows between sponsor and proxy-project and non-sponsor and segment pairs is calculated using cash flows for five years preceding the project initiation year.  
Correlation dummy takes a value of (1/0) if the correlation between cash flows of the sponsor and project or the non-sponsor and its segment is higher (lower) than 
the median correlation value of the sample.  Other firm level variables are as described in Table 5.  Each regression includes project country dummies. Standard 
errors accounts for clustering at firm level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Cash Flow Volatility Sales Volatility 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Non-US US All Non-US US All 
Volatility Difference (Rank) 0.118 ** 1.257*** 0.343 ** 0.129 ** 1.222  *** 1.289  ** 
Correlation of  CF (continuous) 0.112  * 0.314*** 0.141 ** 0.102  * 0.108 ** 0.134  * 
       
Firm Characteristics       
Firm’s  CF  Volatility 0.449 0.499 0.314    
Firm’s  Sales  Volatility    0.111 0.103 0.115 
Firm Size 1.107 ** 1.103*** 1.115  ** 1.102*** 1.208  ** 1.099  ** 
Project Size 1.002*** 1.343*** 1.267*** 1.004  ** 1.093*** 1.103*** 
Leverage 1.014** 1.048*** 1.378*** 1.011  ** 1.783*** 1.412*** 
Free Cash Flow        -0.006       -0.013***       -0.155       -0.004       -0.695***        -0.648 
Diversified        -0.039       -0.096       -0.048       -0.043        0.110         0.057 
Research & Development        -0.016       -0.021        -0.021       -0.012       -0.105        -0.015 
Intangibility         0.003        0.061         0.197        0.002        0.414         0.014 
Market to Book         0.154        0.886         0.815        1.161        0.215         0.241 
            
Firm Level Clustering           Yes         Yes          Yes          Yes         Yes          Yes 
Country Dummies         Yes         Yes          Yes          Yes         Yes          Yes 
       
# Sponsors’ Firm-year Obs.          251        380         631           207         338         545 
# Firm-year Obs.      7,658      12,139    19,797       7,145      9,303    16,448 
# of Strata         104        119         213            98          112          191 
       
χ
2       243.45      368.86      412.79       219.06      353.45      480.27 
P - Value         <.000       <.000       <.000        <.000       <.000      <.000 
   
Table 8: Industry Level Analysis of the Determinants of Project Finance  
 
This table presents estimated coefficient from random effect logistic regressions explaining the probability of project finance during the period from 1990 to 2008. 
The sample is a pooled time series where industry-year represents the observation and the dependent variable equals 1 if at least one firm in the industry invests in 
project finance, zero otherwise. US and non-US denote the two subsamples of firms; all represents the total sample. The sample includes only the projects 
undertaken by the sponsor in its home country. Cash flows (sales) volatility is the median value of the cash flow in the industry. Volatility difference is the absolute 
value of the difference between the median cash flow/sales volatility of the project finance (non-project finance) industry and the median flow/sales volatility of the 
proxy projects (segments) in that industry at three-digit SIC codes. Industry size is the natural log of the median book value of the total assets of the industry. 
Project size is the natural log of median value of the project’s initial cost (book value of the segment’s assets) in a project finance (non-project finance) industry. 
Leverage for a project finance industry is calculated as the sum of the median debt of the industry and the project weighted by their median total assets. Leverage 
for a non- project finance industry is the median value of its debt scaled by total asset.  Diversified is the sales-based Herfindahl Index calculated as the sum of the 
squared market share of each firm in its three-digit SIC code industry. Capital intensity is the median value for firms’ capital expenditure scaled by total assets at 
the three-digit SIC level. Other independent variables are median values for firms in the three-digit SIC Code industry and calculated as described in Table 5. ***, 
**, and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Cash Flow Volatility Sales Volatility 
Independent Variables (1)    (2) (3) (4)     (5) (6) 
 US Non-US All US Non-US All 
Volatility Difference (continuous) 1.109*** 0.638** 1.032 ** 1.003*** 0.542** 1.759*** 
Correlation of CF (continuous) 0.946*** 0.416*** 0.579 ** 0.881*** 0.265*** 0.805*** 
       
Industry Characteristics       
Industry’s  CF  Volatility 0.294 0.401 0.478    
Industry’s  Sales  Volatility    0.145 0.067 0.157 
Industry Size 0.554   * 0.643 ** 0.749  ** 0.635   * 0.678** 0.667** 
Project Size 1.313*** 1.214*** 1.674*** 1.342*** 1.445*** 1.648*** 
Leverage 0.816  ** 0.015  **  0.012** 0.924** 0.056** 0.024** 
Free Cash Flow 0.063** 0.134* 0.149** 0.012** 0.171* 0.184** 
Diversified 0.003 0.168  0.300 0.210  0.734  0.577 
Research & Development -1.014 -1.403  -1.261 -0.031 -0.091  0.247 
Capital Intensity 0.039 **  0.296  **   0.412 ** 0.191 **  0.310 **  0.524 ** 
Market to Book 0.000  0.000   0.000 0.056  0.011  0.001 
Intercept 6.789*** 7.789*** 6.930*** 6.477*** 7.939*** 6.783*** 
       
Industry Random Effect  Yes     Yes     Yes  Yes   Yes    Yes 
Country Fixed Effect  No     Yes     Yes  No   Yes    Yes 
Year Fixed Effect  Yes     Yes     Yes  Yes   Yes    Yes 
#Industry –year Obs.  2,160     990   3,150 2,160    990   3,150 
       
χ
2 350.90        246.90  378.78 346.60        247.67 347.02 
P - Value <.000 <.000 <.000 <.000 <.000 <.000 
   
Table 9:  Low and similar Cash Flow/Sales Volatility, Correlation and Choice of Project Finance 
 
This table presents estimated coefficient from conditional logistic regressions explaining the effect of the interaction of volatility difference and correlation on the 
probability of project finance. US and non-US denote the two subsamples of firms; all represents the total sample. Sample period is from 1990 to 2008. The sample 
includes both single and multi segment firms.  In each matched pair stratum, matched by industry and project announcement year, dependent variable equals 1 if a 
firm invests in project finance. Low and similar volatility is a binary variable that takes a value of one if the rank of the volatility of the sponsor (non-sponsor) and 
project (segment) pair equals either 1 or 2. Rank measure is based on cash flow/sales volatility quartiles where 1(4) is the lowest (highest) volatility quartile. 
Correlation measures the correlation of cash flows between sponsor and project and non-sponsor and its segment using cash flows for five years preceding the 
project initiation year. If a project is originated outside the sponsor’s country, the cash flow of non-sponsor’s segment is adjusted by the ratio of stock return 
volatility in the project country and the sponsor country. Other firm level variables are as described in Table 5. Standard errors accounts for clustering at firm level. 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Cash Flow Volatility Sales Volatility 
Independent Variables (1)     (2) (3) (4)     (5) (6) 
 US Non-US All US Non-US All 
Low and similar Volatility × Correlation 0.673***  0.578 ***  0.683***  0.739***  0.635 ***  0.638***  
Correlation of  Cash Flows  0.285  0.101    0.293  0.230    0.121  0.284  
       
Firm Characteristics       
Firm’s  CF  Volatility  0.190  0.519  0.317     
Firm’s  Sales  Volatility    1.031  0.928  1.102  
Firm Size 0.528***  0.529***  0.522***  0.533***   0.510***  0.511***  
Project Size 0.800***  0.629***  1.023***  0.831***  0.645***  0.832***  
Leverage 0.609***  1.023 ** 1.113***  0.673***  1.190 ** 1.256***  
Free Cash Flow -0.067***  -0.006  -0.034**  -0.045***  -0.003  -0.076 ** 
Diversified  0.836   0.738   0.709  0.812  0.453  0.610  
Research & Development -2.183**   -1.839  -1.312  -2.950  -0.920  -1.178  
Intangibility 0.002  0.103    1.235  1.193  1.384  1.102  
Market to Book -0.043  -0.029    0.104   -0.109  -0.074  -0.138  
            
Firm Level Clustering     Yes    Yes    Yes   Yes   Yes  Yes 
Country dummies   Yes    Yes    Yes   Yes   Yes  Yes 
       
# Sponsors’ Firm-year Obs.     380      251     631    338   207   545 
# Firm-year Obs.   12,139    7,658   19,797 9,303 7,145 16,448 
# of Strata    91       98       189     89  95    184  
       
χ
2   365.57   241.34    413.56   351.45    216.56  454.29 
P - Value   <.000    <.000     <.000    <.000     <.000   <.000 
 
   
Table 10:  Different Cash Flow/Sales Volatility, High Correlation and Choice of Project Finance 
 
This table presents estimated coefficient from conditional logistic regressions explaining the effect of the interaction of volatility difference and correlation on the 
probability of project finance. US and non-US denote the two subsamples of firms; all represents the total sample. Sample period is from 1990 to 2008. The sample 
includes both single and multi segment firms.  In each matched pair stratum, matched by industry and project announcement year, dependent variable equals 1 if a 
firm invests in project finance. Different volatility is a binary variable that takes a value of one if the rank of the volatility difference between the sponsor and proxy 
project or the non-sponsor and its segment equals either 1 or 4. Rank measure is based on cash flow/sales volatility difference quartiles where 1(4) is the lowest 
(highest) volatility quartile. High correlation equals one if the correlation of cash flows between sponsor and proxy project or non-sponsor and its segment is higher 
than the median correlation value of the sample. If a project is originated outside the sponsor’s country,  the cash flow of non-sponsor’s segment is adjusted by the 
ratio of stock return volatility in the project country and the sponsor country. Other firm level variables are as described in Table 5. Standard errors accounts for 
clustering at firm level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Cash Flow Volatility Sales Volatility 
Independent Variables (1)     (2) (3) (4)     (5) (6) 
 US Non-US All US Non-US All 
Different Volatility × High Correlation 0.218   * 0.027 0.213  * 0.206 * 0.082 0.209* 
Correlation of  Cash Flows (dummy) 0.083 0.034 0.095 0.079 0.058 0.087 
       
Firm Characteristics       
Firm’s  CF  Volatility 0.176 0.167  0.187    
Firm’s  Sales  Volatility    1.518 1.389 1.293 
Firm Size 0.563*** 0.489 ** 0.575*** 0.660*** 0.438 **  0.387*** 
Project Size 0.967***  0.849*** 0.954*** 1.098*** 0.830*** 1.412*** 
Leverage  3.021***  2.138  ** 3.028*** 1.187  **  2.489  ** 1.203 ** 
Free Cash Flow -0.121  ** -0.001 -0.125  ** -0.605 -0.002  -0.482 
Diversified  0.874 0.489  0.812 0.428 0.429  0.422 
Research & Development -4.923  ** -0.529 -4.845  ** 0.048  -0.565   0.086 
Intangibility 1.043   1.198  1.040   0.001 1.147  0.003 
Market to Book -0.035 -0.002 -0.001 -0.021 -0.000 -0.002 
            
Firm Level Clustering     Yes    Yes    Yes   Yes   Yes  Yes 
Country Dummies   Yes    Yes    Yes   Yes   Yes  Yes 
       
# Sponsors’ Firm-year Obs.     380      251     631    338   207   545 
# Firm-year Obs.   12,139    7,658   19,797 9,303 7,145 16,448 
# of Strata    119      104      213    112    98   191 
       
χ
2   347.46   247.38    454.85   329.46    217.11  438.03 
P - Value   <.000    <.000     <.000    <.000     <.000   <.000 
 
   
Table 11:  Findings from Selected Robustness Checks  
 
This table presents estimated coefficient from conditional logistic regressions explaining the probability of project finance during the period from 1990 to 2008. 
Dependent variable equals 1 if a firm invests in project finance, 0 otherwise in all regressions.  Panel A consists of the sub-sample of multi-segment firms; Panel B, 
C, D, E, and F comprise both single and multi segment firms. Again, panel D  and E consist of the sub-sample of US firms while Panel A,  B, C and F comprise full 
sample.  In each matched pair stratum, dependent variable equals 1 if a firm invests in project finance. Cash flow (sales) volatility difference is the absolute value of 
the difference in the standard deviation of cash flows (sales) between the sponsor and proxy project and the non-sponsor and its segment. If a project is originated 
outside the sponsor’s country, cash flow (sales) volatility of the non-sponsor’s segment is adjusted by the ratio of stock return volatility in the project country and 
the sponsor country. Rank measure is based on volatility difference quartiles where 1(4) is the lowest (highest) volatility quartile. Correlation of cash flows between 
sponsor and proxy-project and non-sponsor and segment pairs is calculated using cash flows for five years preceding the project initiation year.  Correlation dummy 
takes a value of (1/0) if the correlation between cash flows of the sponsor and project or the non-sponsor and its segment is higher (lower) than the median 
correlation value of the sample. In Panel D and E, Model (1), (2), (3) and (4) report the estimate for US sponsors who invested in projects originated in the US; 
Model (5), (6), (7) and (8) report the estimate for US sponsors who invested in projects originated outside the US. Each regression includes all other explanatory 
and control variables used in Table 7. (For brevity, estimated coefficients are not reported for these variables). Standard errors accounts for clustering at firm level. 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Sub-sample of Multi-segment Sponsors and Non-Sponsors 
 Cash Flow Volatility Sales Volatility 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 US Non-US All US Non-US All 
Volatility Difference (Rank) 0.737** 0.738** 0.746** 0.489* 0.374* 0.637* 
Correlation of  CF (continuous) 1.478** 1.305* 1.586** 1.458* 1.395* 1.684* 
       
# Firm-year Obs. 7,637 3,789 11,426 6,478 2,257 8,735 
χ
2 235.37 169.37 392.73 210.79 145.78 398.39 
P-value <.000 <.000 <.000 <.000 <.000 <.000 
Panel B: Excluding Projects  with Multiple Sponsors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Volatility Difference (Rank) 1.123*** 0.948*** 1.357*** 1.056*** 0.937*** 1.378*** 
Correlation of  CF (continuous) 1.950*** 1.469*** 1.527*** 1.948*** 1.357*** 1.738*** 
       
# Firm-year Obs. 11,467 6,937 18,404 8,457 6,279 14,736 
χ
2 375.48 264.43 428.48 326.89 220.39 418.30 
P-value <.000 <.000 <.000 <.000 <.000 <.000 
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Panel C: Including the Sponsors Traded in the Foreign Exchange 
 Cash Flow Volatility Sales Volatility 
       
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 US Non-US All US Non-US All 
Volatility Difference (Rank) 1.257*** 0.936** 1.289*** 1.136*** 0.992 ** 1.297*** 
Correlation of  CF (continuous) 1.326*** 1.251** 1.428** 1.289*** 1.041 ** 1.420 ** 
       
# Firm-year Obs. 11,517 7,457 18,974 11,517 7,457 18,974 
χ
2 378.82 324.82 389.18 379.12 327.38 389.21 
P-value <.000 <.000 <.000 <.000 <.000 <.000 
 
Panel D: US Sponsor (Non-Sponsor) matched by  Industry, Asset Tangibility and Project Year 
 US Sponsor - US Project US Sponsor – Non-US Project 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Difference  in CF Volatility (Rank) 1.123** 0.948**   1.378 ** 0.920**   
Difference  in Sales Volatility (Rank)   1.056  * 0.937  *   1.389 ** 0.739 ** 
Correlation of  CF (continuous) 1.950**  1.948**  1.390 **  1.378 **  
Correlation (1/0)  1.469**  1.357**  1.749**  1.357** 
         
# Firm-year Obs. 8,357 8,357 5,358 5,358 7, 738 7, 738 4,578 4,578 
χ
2 150.67 151.83 81.37 81.34 148.45 147.46 101.35 100.38 
P-value <.000 <.000 <.000 <.000 <.000 <.000 <.000 <.000 
 
Panel E: Excluding US Sponsor that implemented FASB FIN46 
 US Sponsor - US Project US Sponsor – Non-US Project 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Difference  in CF Volatility (Rank) 1.062*** 0.829***   1.030*** 0.829***   
Difference  in Sales Volatility (Rank)   1.002 *** 0.918***   1.218*** 0.927*** 
Correlation of  CF (continuous) 1.038**  1.026**  1.190 **  1.083 **  
Correlation (1/0)  1.183**  1.145**  1.262**  1.142** 
         
# Firm-year Obs. 8,301 8,301 6,832 6,832 7, 695 7, 695 5,839 5,839 
χ
2 184.48 182.39 180.37 180.23 181.20 181.69 176.29 174.79 
P-value <.000 <.000 <.000 <.000 <.000 <.000 <.000 <.000 
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Panel F: Using Identical Sample of Cash flow and Sales Volatility 
 Cash Flow Volatility Sales Volatility 
   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 US Non-US All US Non-US All 
Volatility Difference (Rank) 1.253*** 0.219 ** 1.256*** 1.222 *** 0.129  ** 1.289 *** 
Correlation of  CF (continuous) 0.117*** 0.131 * 0.154 ** 0.108  ** 0.102 * 0.134  * 
       
# Firm-year Obs. 9,303 7,145 16,448 9,303 7,145 16,448 
χ
2 220.78 352.98 481.38 219.06 353.45 480.27 
P-value <.000 <.000 <.000 <.000 <.000 <.000 
 
  
   
Table 12:  Linear Probability Modeling the Likelihood of Project Finance 
 
This table presents estimated coefficient from linear probability model explaining the probability of project finance during the period from 1990 to 2008. Panel A 
consists of the sub-sample of US firms.  Panel B, C and D comprise full sample.  Dependent variable equals 1 if a firm invests in project finance, 0 otherwise in all 
regressions.  Cash flow (sales) volatility difference is the absolute value of the difference in the standard deviation of cash flows (sales) between the sponsor and 
proxy project and the non-sponsor and its segment. If a project is originated outside the sponsor’s country, cash flow (sales) volatility of the non-sponsor’s segment 
is adjusted by the ratio of stock return volatility in the project country and the sponsor country. Rank measure is based on volatility difference quartiles where 1(4) 
is the lowest (highest) volatility quartile. Correlation of cash flows between sponsor and proxy-project and non-sponsor and segment pairs is calculated using cash 
flows for five years preceding the project initiation year.  Correlation dummy takes a value of (1/0) if the correlation between cash flows of the sponsor and project 
or the non-sponsor and its segment is higher (lower) than the median correlation value of the sample. Low and similar Volatility × Correlation is a binary variable 
in Panel C as described in Table 9.  Different Volatility × High Correlation is described in Table 10. Each regression includes all other explanatory and control 
variables used in Table 7. (For brevity, estimated coefficients are not reported for these variables). All regression except first four columns in Panel A include 
country dummy. All regressions also include firm, industry, and year dummies. Standard errors accounts for clustering at firm level. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Modeling the Likelihood of Project Finance by US Sponsors 
Independent Variables US Sponsor - US Project US Sponsor – Non-US Project 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Difference  in CF Volatility (Rank) 0.589*** 0..638***   0.739 *** 0.639***   
Difference  in Sales Volatility (Rank)   0.125 ** 0.173 **   0.153 ** 0.163 ** 
Correlation of  CF (continuous) 0.539**  0.362**  0.457 **  0.372 **  
Correlation (1/0)  0.352**  0.332**  0.267**  0.372** 
         
# Firm-year Obs. 8,993 8,993 5,345 5,345 3,291 3,291 3,958 3,958 
R2 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 
F-value 256.86 256.90 256.13 255.88 251.37 251.48 251.39 257.32 
Panel B: Modeling the Likelihood of Project Finance by All Sponsors 
 Cash Flow Volatility Sales Volatility 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 US Non-US All US Non-US All 
Volatility Difference (Rank) 0.565*** 0.384*** 0.475*** 0.520*** 0.329*** 0.472*** 
Correlation of  CF (continuous) 0.739** 0.630** 0.683** 0.720** 0.516** 0.528** 
       
# Firm-year Obs. 12,139  7,658 19,797 9,303 7,145 16,448 
R2 0.12 0.10 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.13 
F-value 261.37 263.72 267.19 258.39 251.58 260.38 
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Panel C: Low and similar Cash Flow/Sales Volatility, Correlation and Choice of Project Finance 
 Cash Flow Volatility Sales Volatility 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 US Non-US All US Non-US All 
Low and similar Volatility × Correlation 0.186** 0.029** 0.037** 0.056** 0.041** 0.184** 
Correlation of  Cash Flows  0.158** 0.133** 0.153** 0.157** 0.126** 0.138** 
       
# Firm-year Obs. 12,139  7,658 19,797 9,303 7,145 16,448 
R2 0.16 0.12 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.16 
F-value 183.93 181.27 185.39 180.38 180.67 181.23 
 
Panel D: Different Cash Flow/Sales Volatility, High Correlation and Choice of Project Finance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Different Volatility × High Correlation 0.583*** 0.457*** 0.572*** 0.519*** 0.401*** 0.510*** 
Correlation of  Cash Flows (dummy) 0.240*** 0.168*** 0.193*** 0.273*** 0.171*** 0.203*** 
       
# Firm-year Obs. 12,139  7,658 19,797 9,303 7,145 16,448 
R2 0.20 0.19 0.21 0.17 0.16 0.19 
F-value        191.63 188.27 193.38 193.42 189.82 190.33 
 
 
  
   
Table 13: Random Effect Logistic Regression Modeling the Likelihood of Project Finance by All Sponsors - Pooled Panel 
 
This table presents estimated coefficient from random effect logistic regressions explaining the probability of project finance during the period from 1990 to 2008. 
US and non-US denote the two subsamples of firms; all represents the total sample. Sample period is from 1990 to 2008. The sample includes both single and multi 
segment firms. The sample is a pooled time series where firm-year represents a single observation and the dependent variable equals 1 if a firm invests in project 
finance, zero otherwise. Cash flow (sales) volatility difference is the absolute value of the difference in the standard deviation of cash flows (sales) between the 
sponsor and proxy project and the non-sponsor and its segment. If a project is originated outside the sponsor’s country, cash flow (sales) volatility of the non-
sponsor’s segment is adjusted by the ratio of stock return volatility in the project country and the sponsor country.  Correlation of cash flows between sponsor and 
proxy-project and non-sponsor and segment are calculated on a rolling basis by using the cash flows for past five years. Other firm level variables are as described 
in Table 5. Industry and firm effects are modeled as random effects; the parameters are not reported here. Each regression includes year as well as project country 
dummies. Standard errors accounts for clustering at firm level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Cash Flow Volatility Sales Volatility 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 US Non-US All US Non-US All 
Volatility Difference (continuous) 0.949***  0.583 ** 1.324 ** 0.843*** 0.387 ** 1.223*** 
Correlation of CF (continuous) 0.417*** 0.213 ** 0.384 ** 0.275*** 0.139  * 0.431*** 
       
Firm Characteristics       
Firm’s  CF  Volatility        0.402         0.416        0.467    
Firm’s  Sales  Volatility           0.068        0.023        0.031 
Firm Size 0.649*** 0.573 ** 0.638 ** 0.691*** 0.528*** 0.615*** 
Project Size 1.237*** 1.722*** 1.485*** 1.478*** 1.839 ** 1.172*** 
Leverage        0.014*** 0.013 ** 0.037*** 0.025*** 0.025 **         0.025*** 
Free Cash Flow -0.166***        -0.014          -0.147*** -0.180***        -0.036 -0.163*** 
Diversified        -0.165        -0.147        -0.124        -0.738        -0.091        -0.137 
Research & Development        -1.405        -1.392        -1.834        -0.093        -1.611 -1.032 ** 
Intangibility         0.226         0.245         0.863         0.311         0.365 0.899 ** 
Market to Book         0.000        -0.106        -0.038         -0.001         -0.102        -0.097 
Intercept 4.710***          4.549         6.784***         5.793***        4.683        6.686*** 
       
Firm Random Effect        Yes         Yes          Yes         Yes           Yes          Yes 
Industry Random Effect        Yes         Yes          Yes         Yes           Yes          Yes 
Year Fixed Effect        Yes         Yes          Yes         Yes           Yes          Yes 
Country Fixed Effect         Yes         Yes          Yes         Yes           Yes          Yes 
# Firm-year Obs.      20,428      9,993      30,421        16,993       10,638       27,631 
       
χ
2      375.29       286.94      492.78     347.76       293.27      438.89 
P - Value       <.000         <.000       <.000       <.000        <.000      <.000 
 
   
Table 14: Firm Level Analysis of the Determinants of Project Finance – Panel Data Selection Model  
 
This table presents estimated coefficient from a firm level selection model on panel data for the period from 1990 to 2008.  The selection equation is a cross –
sectional probit model estimated for each year separately. The dependent variable is PF Industry Dummy that takes a value of 1 if at least one firm in the industry 
invests in project finance, zero otherwise. The regression equation is a fixed effect linear regression estimated on a panel data. (see Wooldridge, 1995 for details). 
The sample for this equation is the firms in project finance industry. The dependent variable is PF Firm Dummy that takes a value of 1 if a firm invests in project 
finance. Cash flow (sales) volatility difference is the absolute value of the difference in the standard deviation of cash flows (sales) between the sponsor and proxy 
project and the non-sponsor and its segment. If a project is originated outside the sponsor’s country, cash flow (sales) volatility of the non-sponsor’s segment is 
adjusted by the ratio of stock return volatility in the project country and the sponsor country. Correlation of cash flows between sponsor and proxy-project and non-
sponsor and segment are calculated on a rolling basis by using the cash flows for past five years.  Project size is the natural log of project’s initial cost for a sponsor 
and the natural log of the book value of the segment’s assets for a non-sponsor, respectively. Leverage equals the book value of long-term debt plus debt in current 
liabilities divided by the book value of debt and market value of common equity scaled by total asset of the firm. # of Segments is a binary variable that takes the 
value of 1 if the firm operates in more than one business segments. Other firm level variables are calculated as described in Table 5. All industry level variables are 
firm level values subtracted from industry median. Industry size is the natural log of the median book value of the total assets of the industry. Leverage is calculated 
as the sum of the median debt of the industry weighted by its median total assets.  Project size at the industry level is the natural log of median value of the project’s 
initial cost (book value of the segment’s assets) in a project finance (non-project finance) industry. Capital intensity is the median value for firms’ capital 
expenditure scaled by total assets at the three-digit SIC level. Diversified is the sales-based Herfindahl Index calculated as the sum of the squared market share of 
each firm in its three-digit SIC code industry.  % of PF firms is the percentage of the firms in the industry that invested in project finance at least once. Other 
industry level variables are median values for firms in the three-digit SIC Code industry and calculated as described in Table 5. US and non-US denote the two 
subsamples of industries. Only the projects undertaken in the sponsors’ home countries are included in the sample. All represents the total sample. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 US  Non -US  All  
 (1)     (2) (3)    (4) (5)    (6) 
Independent Variables 
PF Industry 
Dummy (1
st
) 
PF Firm 
Dummy 
PF Industry 
Dummy (1
st
) 
PF Firm 
Dummy 
PF Industry 
Dummy (1
st
) 
PF Firm 
Dummy 
 
Difference  in Cash Flow Volatility  
 1.123**  0.948*  1.056*** 
Correlation of Cash Flows  1.950**  1.948**  1.471** 
       
Firm Characteristics        
Firm Size  0.856***  0.356***  0.313 
Project Size  1.386***  1.867***  1.033 
Leverage  0.038  0.864  0.678 
Free Cash Flow  -0.189*  -0.478  -0.098* 
# of Segments  0.093  0.172  0.220 
Research & Development  -0.638  -0.009  -1.040 
Intangibility  -0.078  -1.829  -0.286 
Market to Book  0.020    0.034   0.044 
Continued 
 
   
       
Industry Characteristics (Median-Firm)        
CF  Volatility -0.445*** -0.511** -0.390** -0.290** -0.494*** -0.501*** 
Industry Size 3.587*** 3.700*** 3.395*** 3.484*** 3.684*** 3.937*** 
Project/Segment Size 1.358*** 1.390*** 1.289*** 1.314*** 0.097*** 0.044*** 
Leverage 0.132 0.196 0.396 0.301 0.971 1.040 
Free Cash Flow 0.136*** -0.125*** 0.084 -0.149 0.333*** -0.313*** 
Diversified -0.046 0.008 0.029 0.068 -0.119 0.098 
Research & Development -0.008 -0.006 -0.018 -0.003 -0.386 -0.408 
Capital Intensity 0.469** 0.123 0.467** 0.239 0.200** 0.220 
Market to Book -0.157 0.197 -0.147 0.136 -0.280 0.286 
Intercept 3.012* 2.987 2.945 * 2.961 3.010  ** 2.590 
       
Firm Fixed Effect       Yes       Yes       Yes 
# Firm-year Obs. 20,428  12,139      9,993 7,658 30,421    19,797 
 
 
